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3 August 1982

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INDONESIA

CONDITIONS IN EAST TIMOR DESCRIBED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 29 Jul 82 p 4

[Text] East Timor is slowly emerging from its nightmare. After 7 years of civil war, of armed struggle for independence and of guerrilla war, of famine, malnutrition and devastating epidemics, the people finally seem to be on their way to finding peace. Life is slowly regaining its rights and an apparent tranquillity is settling over the island. Of course, not all problems have been suddenly solved, but they now stem more from underdevelopment than from political and military confrontation.

The FRETILIN--the liberation front--now only leave their mountains in search of food. Over the entire territory--some 15,000 square kms--there are reportedly no more than 150 to 250 armed rebels if one is to believe the military authorities. They are divided into small groups of about a dozen individuals, who are often accompanied by their families. Integration into the Indonesian Republic is inexorably following its course and seems practically irreversible.

The island of Timor, located about one hour's flight from the Australian coast, has been, ever since the 17th century, a stake in Portuguese-Dutch rivalry. Following 200 years of sporadic confrontation, the colonizers agreed to divide the spoils: the western part remained under Dutch control, with Portugal keeping the eastern sector. Thus it was that Indonesia naturally extended its sovereignty over West Timor when it freed itself from the Dutch crown in 1945. For its part, Lisbon jealously preserved its zone, occasionally putting down successive attempts at revolution. With the 1974 "carnation revolution," a new situation evolved. The new Portuguese government under Gen Spínola accepted the principle of decolonization. In Timor, it was the point of departure for a race to power between the various political formations advocating diametrically opposed solutions. Very soon the FRETILIN--with a Marxist bent--was the winner in the field. Bolstered by its military victory, it unilaterally proclaimed independence. This was not to the liking of the Indonesians, who, in response, landed their troops with a view to annexing the territory. The struggle was intense and the guerrilla war was extended over the entire island.

A new tragedy began. Thousands, tens of thousands of people--some say even more--soon died of hunger, disease and exhaustion. The very primitive population was terrorized both by the rebels and the Indonesian army. There were untold

victims. It is said that one-fourth of the inhabitants of East Timor--200,000 to 250,000--perished. No one knows for sure. However, one thing is certain: the massacre would have been greater were it not for the gigantic rescue operation mounted by the International Red Cross, which established shelters and regrouping villages all over the island.

Today the situation has profoundly changed. Security appears to be total. The country can be crisscrossed without escort and peasant life has started again. Agricultural production has been developed to the point that it can satisfy the needs of the approximately 555,000 inhabitants. In 1981 the rice harvest exceeded 110,000 tons, while only 90,000 tons can feed the population. Stocks have been formed. International aid is still being accepted so as to secure the rear guard. Undeniably, Indonesian authorities--so vehemently criticized--took it to heart to achieve impressive efforts. If in 1976 investments amounted to 12 billion rupies, the budget increased to 34 billion in 1981, or 84 million dollars. While illiteracy was almost generalized--up to 95 percent--today every other child goes to school.

Incontestably, life has changed radically; it seems resolutely engaged in the struggle against underdevelopment. About 3,500 soldiers ensure security. Even though military operations are kept under a discreet silence, it seems that there have been no clashes in the past few months. The military command has abandoned the idea of conducting large-scale operations to force the rebels to leave their hiding places. The tendency is rather to isolate them and cut them off from all contact with the people. It was obvious that the FRETILIN soldiers came to the villages in search of the food and medicines they lacked. Willingly or not, peasants responded favorably to their requests.

To end this support, authorities did not hesitate to transfer 826 families--altogether 3,352 people--from Timor to Aurore. This is another island located at a distance of a 15-minute helicopter ride off Dili, the capital. The Indonesians have built a large village there, setting up health centers and giving peasants land for tilling.

The displaced people have lost their freedom. I visited Aurore together with the International Red Cross delegate. Indeed, the Red Cross immediately asked to be allowed there. It proposed to the Indonesians to provide assistance, which was accepted. Some time in the future, some of the displaced people may be allowed to return to their villages of origin. That is why the Indonesians speak of a temporary displacement. But that day has not arrived yet, and no one knows when the situation will permit it.

CSO: 4200/52

COLUMNIST SCORES DK LEADERSHIP, SIHANOUK

Paris MOUL KHMER in Cambodian May 82 pp 11, 12

[Text] In March 1982, LE MONDE published an appeal by a notorious murderer, Khieu Samphan: "Let Khmers Think of Their National Interest." We would like to address the following questions to this murderer: What is the national interest? This irreligious murderer himself has a doctorate degree.

As everyone knows very well that "national" means 3 million Khmer people killed with Khieu Samphan, Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and Son Sen as the killers. If all these notorious murderers completely killed the nation, to whom, then, are they making an appeal to join them? Even if they exhume bodies of their mothers, nobody is going to be persuaded to join them save a certain inferior person who still keeps imagining that Pol Pot might make him king again. Are there any Khmers who did not fall victim to that wretch Khieu Samphan and his clique? Even Prince Sihanouk who made great efforts to help the clique in order to ascend to the throne in order to kill Khmers, was also made to suffer with 10 of his children and grandchildren killed. Now he joins with the clique again. Joining with the Khmer Rouge in a business venture requires no capital to invest. It is easy to make a living. Don't plan on cheating the Khmer Rouge, because this time around, Dear Prince if they regain power, you will surely not get any more (foie gras or champagne) as before. Perhaps you will likely get struck with the handle of a shovel.

Recently, the irreligious Khmer Rouge invited a Buddhist monk--the Venerable Bel Long to pray at a housewarming in the jungle. This Buddhist monk from India has never tasted the soup of the irreligious Khmer Rouge. If he had, he probably would not have dared to come near them.

For Khieu Samphan and his clique, even if the Buddha was still alive, he could not save them from sin because there is not enough room in hell in which to put him and his clique. It is ridiculous to see in the picture the murderous Khieu Samphan and Ieng Sary sitting cross-legged in front of the Buddhist monk as if they were devout Buddhists.

I would like to inform Venerable Bel Long that I knew Khieu Samphan's family very well. His mother's name is Mrs Kong and his uncle is Mr Chuok, a house builder. His other uncle is a teacher. His name is Mr Var. They all used to live in the province of Kompong Cham. His mother and his two uncles were real Buddhists. I used to live in the Thmar Kol and the Beng Kok temples. I also

used to pick up food for the monks from his house. When he accompanied his mother to the temple Khieu Samphan always sat cross-legged in front of the Buddhist monk the way he sat with legs crossed in front of you. Therefore, you should be aware that this person is a "hypocrite." If he regains power, you really won't have enough time to put on your yellow robe to run to your plane. He even dared to kill the patriarch Huot Tat who was 80 years old. He also used ropes to pull down Buddha's images from the temples, destroyed almost all the temples, disrobed all the monks and asked them to get married. Any monk who refused the order was beheaded.

Please beware of them all if you deal with them. They would kill you in the first opportunity. I know them very well because I did farm work with them for 4 years. I would like to end now and will let you know more about him next time.

Chut Kher

CSO: 4212/22

ATTITUDE TOWARD KING EXPLAINED

BK021542 (Clandestine) Voice of Malayan Democracy in Malay 1215 GMT 30 Jun 82

[Article by the information service of the Malay Nationalist Revolutionary Party of Malaya dated 2 November 1981, entitled: "The Attitude to the MNRPM Toward the Position of the Raja"]

[Summary from poor reception] Lately there has been sharp friction between the United Malays National Organization [UMNO] ruling clique and the Raja, and the press has commented on the position of the Raja. Although the friction occurred quite some time ago, the ruling UMNO leaders have been reluctant to discuss it in public because issues involving sultans are regarded as sensitive. They began to speak up only after Tunku Abdul Rahman said in his article on 5 October that in the interest of maintaining parliamentary democracy and the people's sovereignty, sultans should not involve themselves in politics nor reject any government decision. He even warned that if a sultan rejected a government decision, the government could declare a state of emergency and (?amend) the constitution to change the position of the Raja.

Everyone knows that the position of the sultans in the modern era is a historical legacy. Regarding this position the Malay Nationalist Revolutionary Party of Malaya [MNRPM] in its 24 May founding manifesto said: "Ever since the Malaka Sultanate, there have been sultans and aristocrats who have sided with the people in their struggle against the invasion and domination of the Portuguese, Dutch and British. There have been others who became tools of the colonialists.

"The MNRPM calls on the sultans and aristocrats to inherit and promote the patriotic tradition of our forefathers in fighting colonialism and siding with the people and in sympathizing with and supporting their patriotic struggle. Only by doing this can the sultans and aristocrats win the people's respect and support. If they betray the fatherland and the people, they are bound to be opposed by the people.

"Our basic position is a matter of principle which is straightforward and in accordance with the historical facts and the current demand of our time. It is entirely different from the opportunist position of the ruling UMNO clique, which is aimed solely at exploiting the sultans for its own interest. Since our position can properly solve problems related to the position of the Raja in our country, it has been warmly endorsed by the masses of all strata of the various groups in our country."

The public knows that the MNRPM is the continuation of the Malay Nationalist Party of Malaya [MNPM] in the new historical period. "The main objective of the MNRPM is to rouse all the Malayan people, particularly to unite the various strata and groups of all Malay patriotic forces in order to establish a nationalist united front and a democratic national coalition government comprising all patriotic parties, organizations and individuals from various strata of all nationalities in order to safeguard the people's interest and to defend the independence and well-being of our fatherland."

The national front government in Kuala Lumpur, with UMNO as its core, and the People's Action Party government in Singapore are not democratic and patriotic governments. Various revolutionary and patriotic forces, including the MNRPM, have waged various struggles, particularly armed struggle, shed their blood and sacrificed body and soul for the sake of our independence. But it was UMNO leaders who betrayed our struggle. They prostrated to the British and accepted all the colonialist conditions. As a result our independence was not complete--Singapore was detached from the Peninsula and our country continued to be dominated by the imperialists in the form of neocolonialism. Our abundant natural resources were turned over to foreign monopoly capitalists, bureaucrat capitalists, comprador capitalists and big local landowners who arbitrarily exploited the people. They legislated all kinds of harsh laws, suppressed the just mass struggle, seized the people's democratic rights, arrested and jailed political opponents and so forth. These facts prove that under these two governments our country has become a paradise for the wealthy class but on the other hand it has become hell for the poor Malays and other nationalities.

The MNRPM believes that only a democratic national coalition government--as stated earlier--can replace the two governments in order to safeguard the fatherland and the people from destruction and misery. In this regard, the MNRPM has already presented a 12-point program which incorporates the main interests of the Malay nation while taking into consideration the basic interests of the broad masses. The manifesto on the founding of our party also said that the interest of progressive sultans and aristocrats is also taken into consideration.

"A cooperative relationship between the revolutionary and patriotic forces and progressive sultans and aristocrats is not new. Our history since World War II shows that some sultans and aristocrats were sympathetic to the patriotic people's struggle against the Japanese fascists. When the Japanese fascists and the British colonialists committed wholesale massacres of various nationalities before and after the end of the war, a number of sultans, such as the sultans of Perak, Trengganu and Pahang cooperated and worked to end the disturbances among the nationalities. There existed mutual understanding and cooperation between various sultans and the MNPM, which at that time was doing its utmost to ease the tense relationship between the nationalities and to restore understanding among them. In addition, during the anti-Japanese resistance war, [words indistinct] of Negri Sembilan gave invaluable contribution to the anti-Japanese Malayan People's Army--an anti-Japanese people's army."

Both the MNRPM and the MNPM have a firm foundation. "Our attitude toward the sultans is decided by the attitude and position of the individual sultan toward the people's democratic and patriotic struggle." Since the aggression by foreign powers against our country, particularly since the British imperialist colonial rule, the sultans have been deprived of their power by the colonialists. The present ruling clique also continues this situation under which sultans are merely symbols and tools of the ruling clique. The ruling clique's increasing arbitrary acts both at the national and state levels have not only aggravated its conflict with the masses, but have also sharpened its conflicts with various sultans.

"In Pahang, in its attempts to control the state and plunder its natural resources, in recent years the UMNO ruling clique has installed its trusted man as chief minister despite the fact that he was not liked and was even opposed by the people and the sultan. Although in the end this chief minister was forced to resign, nevertheless the UMNO ruling clique again ignored the sultan's wishes when it installed his successor, thereby continuing the conflict.

"In Johor, bribery irregularities and immoral acts were rife and chief minister Othman Saat was one of the major corruptors. This became so conspicuous that the sultan in his Friday sermons and on other occasions resolutely pointed out these misdeeds. In the end, His Majesty issued a drastic directive ordering the chief minister to vacate his post within 24 hours.

"In Selangor, His Majesty the Sultan was not only dissatisfied with the central government's compensation for the taking over of Kuala Lumpur, but was also fed up with the empty promises of the central government which, after 20 years, has yet to build the badly needed hospital in Klang. As a result, His Majesty has offered to turn his palace into a people's hospital.

"The ruling clique, who cannot tolerate any criticism, responded negatively to the criticism. It angrily demanded that the sultans shut their mouths and not interfere in government affairs."

On 6 October, 13 chief ministers issued a joint statement endorsing Tunku Abdul Rahman's attitude toward the sultans. On 7 October the NEW STRAITS TIMES, which represents the ruling clique, warned of a dangerous trend with the sultans interfering in political affairs.

It has become evident from these developments that the ruling clique regards the sultans as mere symbols to be exploited for the sake of its authority. What is meant by safeguarding parliamentary democracy and the people's sovereignty is in fact the continuation of its own authority. The ruling clique, pursuing its own interests, arbitrarily passed a sedition act prohibiting anyone from making an issue of the position of the Raja. The so-called state philosophy calls for loyalty to the Raja. But the real intention of the ruling clique is to seek loyalty to its government without any challenge to its position. Therefore, when a sultan expressed his opposition to this arbitrary sedition act, he was also arrogantly challenging the Raja in disregard of the act and principle it had laid down.

"The internal and external situation is now increasingly tense. The ruling clique headed by Mahathir and Musa has continued to wield its iron fists and harshly warned that it could not tolerate opposition and threatened to take action against anyone who opposed the regime. In the meantime, although the Soviet-Vietnamese threat is increasing, the Kuala Lumpur ruling clique has continued to pursue reconciliation toward the aggressors and has spread the word that the Soviets and Vietnamese would not subjugate the ASEAN countries."

This posture has betrayed the people and will slacken the vigilance and preparedness of the people and an invitation to the aggressors to subjugate our country. In view of this fact, the broad masses should intensify their struggle against the policies of the ruling clique and resist enemies from abroad.

"Under these grave circumstances, it is the hope of the masses that the sultans and aristocrats are aware of the turbulent situation; will sincerely inherit and promote the patriotic tradition of our forefathers in fighting foreign aggressors; and will unite with the broad masses and all patriotic forces of our fatherland to oppose the arbitrary acts and injustices of the ruling clique and to resist the Soviet-Vietnamese aggression for the defense of the nation and the state. By doing this, sultans and aristocrats will be assured a proper place in history and society and will win the respect of the people."

CSO: 4213/4

NEPAL

BRIEFS

AMBASSADOR TO AUSTRIA--Katmandu, 4 Jul--Royal Nepalese Ambassador Ramhari Sharma presented his credentials to the president of the Republic of Austria, Mr. Rudolf Kirchschlaeger in Vienna on July 2, it is learnt from the Foreign Ministry today, reports RSS. Mr Ramhari Sharma is the resident Royal Nepalese ambassador in Bonn, concurrently accredited to the Republic of Austria. [Text] [BK110943 Katmandu RISING NEPAL in English 5 Jul 82 p 1 BK]

HIGHWAY LINK WITH TIBET--Katmandu, 26 Jun (AFP)--An agreement on the reconstruction with Chinese assistance of the 26.5 kilometres Barabesi-Kodari highway linking Nepal with Lhasa in Tibet was signed here on Friday [25 June]. The signatories were Nepal's chief engineer Shiva Bahadur Pradhanang and economic counsellor Liu Xi Hui for China. Under the agreement two large and one medium bridges will also be built on the section of the highway which was damaged by flash floods last July. Construction of the road is expected to start at the end of the current monsoon season and is due for completion in about three years. The capital cost is estimated to be about 34 million U.S. dollars. Forty-five Chinese and four Nepalese technicians have already completed the survey work. Trade between Nepal and Tibet has decreased substantially since use of the highway was disrupted. It was built by China in 1966. [Text] [BK020425 Hong Kong AFP in English 0809 GMT 26 Jun 82 BK]

CSO: 4220/250

U.S. CRITICIZED FOR SUPPORTING ISRAEL AGAINST MUSLIM COUNTRIES

Rawalpindi TAMEER in Urdu 11 Jun 82 p 2

[Editorial: "America's 'Friendship For Muslims'!"]

[Text] Israel's aggression against Lebanon has become a large scale war, and now there have also been battles between the Syrian army and the Israeli army and air force in several places. The war in the Biga' valley between the planes of Syria and Israel in which 100 Israeli planes and more than 60 Syrian planes took part can be called the largest air battle in the Middle East. The situation is such that it could at any moment become a danger for world peace. But even if there were no danger for world peace, when a country's freedom and existence are in danger, it is a matter which makes it a duty for the United Nations to intervene with all its resources. However, the events of the past few days in the Security Council, and the impudence with which America vetoed the resolution put forward by Spain, have proved once more (if any proof was needed) that America and Israel are one. America's appeals to Israel to remain peaceful are nothing but an attempt to deceive the world. What Israel has done and what it is doing now are not only with the full knowledge of America but with its blessings as well. The past day the Security Council advised all three, Lebanon, the PLO, and Israel, to stop the war, and this resolution was agreed upon by all members. Only Israel refused to accept it, and continued the war in direct contradiction to it. In this situation the sole path open to the Security Council was for it to condemn the party not complying with its order and to urge it once more to stop the war. If this too should produce no result, it should decide to institute censure proceedings. Spain's resolution had been presented with this objective in mind. It had the support of all the members of the Security Council, with the exception of America. America rejected it by veto, thus rejecting the opinions of all the Islamic countries, all the nations of the Third World, and all the countries of Western Europe and Asia. This incident has completely laid bare several realities. One is that America is not only the friend, patron and protector of Israel, it is also the enemy of the freedom of the Muslim countries. It has resolved to use Israel to destroy all those Muslim countries which do not obey it and which have the temerity to call themselves free. It has also become obvious that the Arab and Muslim countries which hope for a peaceful understanding and just settlement with Israel by means of America are living in a fools' paradise, and if they do not open their eyes even now, it can only mean that they do not wish to open them.

This aggression by Israel has also exposed the hoax of the United Nations peacekeeping force. The United Nations army posted to Lebanon did not make even the slightest attempt to stop the Israeli invaders. In fact, according to the PLO, it even helped the invaders.

The words with which President Zia-ul Haq has condemned this manifestation of barbarity express the sentiments of not just the people of Pakistan but all Muslims and all those who love justice throughout the world. But the question is, can these verbal protests from Muslim countries actually do any harm to Israel or provide any protection for the freedom loving Palestinians who are being martyred at every moment? Can the freedom and existence of Lebanon be saved this way? If the amount of degradation the Islamic countries and the Arab brotherhood have already undergone is enough, then it is time for them to decide to manfully face the truth. They should understand that the meaning of supporting the cause of the Palestinians and Jerusalem is that they will have to draw decisive battle lines not just with the international Zionists but with their patron America as well. The countries which lack the courage to do so should no longer claim to support Jerusalem or the Palestinians or even Islamic unity.

9914

CSO: 4203/147

ISLAMIC COUNTRIES CALLED ON TO PUNISH U.S. FOR SUPPORTING ISRAEL

Rawalpindi TAMEER in Urdu 19 Jun p 2

[Editorial: "When Will the Islamic Countries Take Action?"]

[Text] The Government of Pakistan has taken the right step in expressing its anxiety over the situation in Lebanon to the American government. America is just as responsible for what has happened in Lebanon, and what is still happening there, as is Israel. America hasn't ever even tried to hide the fact that despite all of Israel's lawlessness and terrorism it will not only continue to give it aid but will also supply it with protection against world opinion and the reaction of the Arabs it has victimized. The Pakistan government has also given practical expression to its sympathy by sending 15 million rupees to supply the immediate needs of the freedom loving Palestinians. However, Israel has spread destruction on such a wide scale that it demands that Pakistan and all Islamic countries arrange for a supply of aid on a wide scale in order to compensate for this destruction to the extent possible. For this they should coordinate their efforts as much as possible. The need at the present time is for medical aid for the wounded, and housing and food for the homeless. But this is just one aspect of the problem. The other aspect is that urgent efforts should be made on an international level to get the Israeli army out of Lebanon. The total political and economic power of the Islamic countries should be used in every way for this purpose so that Israel will not stay permanently in Lebanon too, as it has in other occupied territories. The third and most important necessity is to answer Israel with strength with the aid of the arms and armies of Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian freedom lovers. It is a fact that Israel's attack on Lebanon had been expected for a long time. If the Islamic countries had prepared to meet this situation beforehand the conditions today would not be so tragic. But it is no use lamenting what has already happened. Now, due to pressure from the Soviet Union and other conditions, there is a makeshift ceasefire. The Islamic countries should take advantage of the respite this allows to take steps to make a coordinated response on all fronts. The Libyan leader Colonel Qadhafi has said that his country intends to send troops to Lebanon, but nothing will happen from Libya's decision. Iran and South Yemen have also sent some volunteers to fight shoulder to shoulder with the freedom fighters, but their number too is very small, while the Israeli army is not only greater in number but also superior in arms. The greatest benefit of a joint plan will be that in the future not only Israel, but America too, will have to seriously

consider the results of challenging the collective power of the Islamic countries. It is necessary to use all available weapons on the economic front as well, including a restriction on the supply of oil. Although in their meeting the oil exporting Arab countries rejected Libya's proposal to shut off the supply of oil for the Western countries, this decision was taken for technical reasons. If such a decision were made on the part of the Arab leaders its necessarily good results would be apparent. It is not necessary that this restriction be applied against all Western countries. The majority of the Western countries condemned the Israeli aggression, and they all also supported the resolution of condemnation in the Security Council. For this reason, it will be sufficient in the beginning to apply restrictions only to America, which helped Israel tighten its grasp on Lebanon by means of its veto. If America considers the feelings of the Muslim countries so little worthy of respect, and the blood of hundreds of thousands of Arabs and the freedom of Arab countries of so little worth, what are the Islamic countries thinking of? Why are they silent?

9914

CSO: 4203/147

PAKISTAN

PLANNED 1982 FOOD AID FOR REFUGEES

GF181035 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 7 Jul 82 p 8

[Text] Islamabad, 6 Jul (APP)--Himalaya A. Rana, the United Nations resident co-ordinator for U.N. system's development activities, who also represented the World Food Programme (WFP) in Pakistan, told the World Bank consortium for Pakistan, at its recent meeting in Paris, that WFP would provide a massive humanitarian food aid worth \$95 million for the Afghan refugees in Pakistan during 1982.

Making a strong plea for additional food aid for the Afghan refugees, Mr Rana said, there would be a need for 1983 a minimum of 360,000 tons of wheat, 20,000 tons of milk powder and 15,000 tons of oil. These, he said would be in addition to 770,000 tons of wheat, 39,000 tons of oil and 29,000 tons of milk already pledged.

The pledges over the last two years, Mr Rana said, would cover the food needs up to 15 January 1983 for wheat, January 31 1983 for milk and 30 April 1983 for oil.

Paying tributes to the donor countries for their generous contributions, Mr Rana said, so far the United States had provided more than half the resources, followed by EEC, Australia, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other countries.

Concluding, Mr Rana expressed the hope that more resources would be forthcoming for 1983. He also stressed the need for extending support to the refugees administration of the government of Pakistan, which, he said, "shoulders, with commendable efficiency, an enormous and costly task."

CSO: 4220/249

WHY ISLAMISATION IS FALTERING

London ARABIA in English No 10, Jun 82 pp 14-16

[Article by Javed Ansari]

[Text]

☉ In June 1977, when General Muhammad Zia ul Haq assumed power as Pakistan's head of state, the movement for Islamisation had won popular support in all of Pakistan's major cities. The strength of this movement did not abate with the military's seizure of power. In the early days of military rule the Islamic forces succeeded in retaining massive support in Pakistan. The political strategists of the new administration had no alternative but to seek accommodation with the popular Islamic parties.

This accommodation was worked out by committing the government to a policy of 'gradual Islamisation reforms' in line with some of the proposals of the Islamic parties. As political estrangement between the military government and Bhutto's People's Party increased, the emphasis on Islamisation became more pronounced. From 1979 onwards the Islamisation programme has been presented as a vehicle for preparing the country for the transition to democracy. This programme has also sometimes become a means for undermining the political legitimacy of the Islamic parties of Pakistan.

President Zia, a man of deep religious convictions, has put his heart and soul behind the Islamisation initiatives. In almost every speech since June 1977, Zia has reiterated his commitment to Islamic ideology and exhorted the people to remould their lives in accordance with Islamic teachings. During a recent trip to Pakistan I gained the impression that Zia's enthusiasm was not shared by all the top brass within the country's bureaucratic establishment.

Since 1978 the Islamisation programme has proceeded at three levels. Priority has been given to the task of Islamising the legal system. In December 1978 a presidential ordinance

established five shariah benches attached to the four provincial courts and to the Supreme Court of Pakistan. In May 1980 the four provincial benches and the appellate shariah bench at the Supreme Court were replaced by a federal shariah court composed of five 'secular' judges and three ulema. This court can, on the petition of a citizen of Pakistan or of the government, give judgement as to whether a law is repugnant to Islam and to suggest appropriate amendments. The federal shariah court does not have the authority to give judgement on the status of Muslim personal law, the law of procedure and tribunals, the constitution of the republic, fiscal laws, or laws relating to banking and insurance.

Relatively greater progress has been made in the Islamisation of the Pakistan penal code. In 1979, a series of ordinances was promulgated amending existing laws relating to the offences of theft, adultery, false accusation of adultery and alcoholic consumption. The Council on Islamic Ideology (CII) has put forward recommendations for promulgating a law of pre-emption, a law of gusas (the acceptance of blood money) and a law of evidence (shahadah). The government has yet to act on these recommendations.

The government has also sponsored a series of initiatives to Islamise the economic life of the country. In 1980 the laws relating to wealth tax, income tax and land revenue were amended to provide for the collection of zakat. The government has been empowered to make deductions at source at the rate of 2½ per cent from bank deposits, company shares, insurance policies and so on held by Sunni Muslim citizens of Pakistan. An elaborate administrative structure for the collection and disbursement of zakat, with federal, provincial and local zakat committees (these latter number-

ing 32,000) has been established. The same law also provided for the collection of al-ushr, but the implementation of this section of the law has been indefinitely postponed.

Measures have also been taken to create an 'interest free' sphere within the national economy. From July 1979 house-building loans were exempted from interest charges. Some public sector investment institutions – such as the National Investment Trust and the Investment Corporation of Pakistan – have switched over to operating on a 'profit and loss sharing' basis. During 1980 profit and loss sharing counters were opened at all the 7,000 branches of domestic Pakistani banks. Interest based operations were maintained and there was no public commitment to their eventual elimination.

Finally, the government has made an attempt at reformulating the national educational policy. An extensive review of textbooks at all levels has been undertaken to remove material repugnant to the teachings of Islam. Islamic studies have been prescribed as a compulsory subject up to graduation level and are included in examinations for appointment to the senior civil and administrative services of Pakistan. The emphasis on Islamic teachings has also increased at the various military academies and there has been an upgrading in the salary and status of khateeb (religious teachers) on service with the Pakistan army. The degree granted by religious educational establishments has been recognised as equivalent to a masters degree of a Pakistani university.

Arrangements are being made for extension of training in Islamic jurisprudence. In October 1979 a shariah faculty was established at the country's leading research university at Islamabad. It emphasises the training of specialists in shariah law and operates a masters course in the subject. In November 1980 the shariah faculty was transformed into an Islamic university thanks to substantial assistance from the King Abdul Aziz University of Saudi Arabia. The rector of the new university, A K Brohi, a well-known international lawyer, has ambitious plans for its extension and consolidation. Special emphasis is placed on the role of the fledgling dawa (Islamic promulgation) department which aims at making the resources of the university accessible to a large cross section of urban and rural communities.

The impact of these Islamisation measures on Pakistani society can at best be described as modest. The legal reforms appear contrived and artificial to a judicial establishment schooled in the British tradition. It instinctively fights shy of these reforms and consciously

seeks a reinterpretation of Islamic law to legitimise existing practices and norms. References to the shariah courts have been relatively rare and its recommendations – as well as the recommendations of the Council on Islamic Ideology (CII) – have been implemented in a diluted form. Thus the legal establishment has resisted imposing the code of Islamic punishment on criminal offenders and a controversy about the role of sunnah as basis for Islamic legislation has been institutionally sustained. This controversy was most in evidence in the debates relating to the interpretation of the Islamic punishment for rape and illicit sex offences (qazf) but challenges to the use of sunnah as a basis for determining punishment have also surfaced in connection with the punishment of theft and banditry.

The lack of imposition of the Islamic penal code has meant that there has been no noticeable improvement in law and order in the country. Zia referred to "cases of intimidation and brigandage" in his speech on December 24, 1981. The government itself has recognized that "the change brought about by (these) hadood laws, though fundamental, has not created the kind of immediate impact that many well-meaning and knowledgeable persons had been expecting." A state of general disillusionment has set in and many people feel that government – sponsored Islamisation has not created a dent in Pakistan's legal system which is dominated by an establishment with little comprehension of Islamic jurisprudence.

The economic reforms have been even more ineffectual. The inability to levy ushr has meant that the government has no access to agricultural income for purposes of welfare taxation. Options available to the landlords for evading levies remain large as long as the government allows a "non-organised" money market (with the traditional banya firmly in control) to flourish. Even the urban saving groups have availed themselves of these options, as well as of opportunities provided by the existence of a thriving group of foreign banks, to avoid payment of zakat. Zakat collection during 1980-81 has been pitifully small, amounting to Rs800m, representing less than two per cent of federal revenue and quite insufficient to meet the needs of the mostadfeen, who constitute a large proportion of Pakistan's population.

Equally insignificant is the impact of the experiment with interest-free banking. As noted elsewhere, the amount deposited in profit and loss sharing accounts represents about 35 per cent of the total bank deposits in the country. This proportion shows no sign of increasing substantially. No effective mechan-

ism has been evolved for deployment of these funds. Most branches simply do not have facilities to undertake realistic feasibility studies and savings mobilised through profit and loss schemes are invested according to government directives.

The educational reforms have produced a climate of change in the ranks and junior officer corps of the military establishment. There is an increasing influence, sometimes officially encouraged, of the jamaat tabligh in these circles. In civilian life the educational initiatives have borne little fruit. Many ulema view these initiatives with deep suspicion. One of Karachi's leading alims (who has asked to remain unnamed) told me that he regarded the building of the Islamic University and the growth of the dawa department as the first step taken by the Zia administration to impose regimentation on the Pakistani ulema on the lines of the Turkish and Malaysian government. He said that the ulema should resist any attempt at standardising madrassah syllabuses and the provision of official (or semi-official) patronage. These views were echoed by a wide range of religious opinion in Pakistan.

Religious circles in Pakistan are very worried about the ineffectiveness of Zia ul Haq's Islamisation programme. Many members of the CII blame organised groups within the federal ministry officials who act as intermediaries between the CII and the president. A member of the CII told me that Zia is often frustrated in his attempts to accelerate Islamisation. He and two other members of the CII alleged that a well-knit group of senior government officials had now been formed under the leadership of Ghulam Ishak Khan, the federal finance and planning minister, to slow down methodically the pace of Islamisation. Ghulam Ishak Khan had successfully frustrated the initiatives of the CII on the question of the implementation of zakat and the abolition of interest. He had seen to it that zakat was collected only from one section of the community and that the commitment to interest-based banking was not reduced by the opening of the profit and loss counters. This had ensured that both schemes were stillborn, the CII member said. Ghulam Ishak Khan has emerged as an increasingly powerful figure. He has been in office since 1977. It is said that he now endorses many changes in economic policy without bothering to consult Zia, who is not particularly interested in economic affairs.

It is clear that, since the 1979 estrangement between Zia and the political parties, the civil bureaucracy has consolidated its position and now plays a very important part in political decision-making. It has succeeded in inducing the president to forbid the CII from publishing

its recommendations. The bureaucracy has thus in effect become the sole determinant of the pace of Islamisation within the country. Moreover, the political power of the bureaucracy has increased due to the role it has been allowed to play in the selection of the Federal Council – the majlis e shura. It is said that although suggestions for nomination to the Council were invited from a wide range of interests, ultimately it was the Deputy Commissioner and provincial level civil administrators who determined the government's choice of representatives in the majlis.

In his inaugural address to the Federal Council, Zia said that its primary task was "to help the government accelerate the process of the enforcement of Islam." But such an acceleration calls for the mobilisation of popular support and the building of a new set of institutions which could ensure that those committed to Islam became capable of exercising social and political authority. The administration has resisted all attempts at building this institutional base for Islamising Pakistan.

Pakistani bureaucrats ensured that the politicians within the Republican Party of the 1950s and within the Convention Muslim League of the 1960s played just such a role. Today the Pakistani bureaucracy seeks to transform the majlis e shura into a new, rejuvenated Convention Muslim League. The majlis is thus entrusted with the task of invoking the name of Islam to legitimise continued domination of new colonial structures of suppression.

In the eyes of the bureaucracy those who challenge the legitimacy of these institutions represent the greatest threat to the "security of Pakistan." It is therefore natural that it should seek to isolate and politically ostracise the Jamaat Islami, a party committed to Islamic revolution, and capable of challenging the social and political hegemony of the bureaucracy and of its supporters.

During the period March to June 1977 the organisational adaptability of the Jamaat enabled the Pakistan National Alliance to destroy civilian authority at neighbourhood level and constitute a revolutionary basis of Islamic power. This period of Islamic hegemony is a nightmare to all of Pakistan's top mandarins. They thus put emphasis on the need to suppress attempts at building powerful institutions at the base of the Pakistani polity.

But the strategy of consolidating the existing political structure while paying lip service to Islam is full of danger for President Zia. Zia enjoys political support much as Ayub Khan did, due to favourable economic conditions, generous military and economic assistance and the expectation that, as time goes on, fun-


damental change in social conditions and in ideological orientation will occur. A worsening of the economic climate, a reduction in aid and a persistent inability to deal with corruption and nepotism may have as serious consequences for Zia as they did for Ayub. Already the government has had to put up the price of essential commodities; there has been a bad wheat harvest; the rupee has been devalued; violence at universities is rising; inter-communal rioting persists. The foreign scene remains confused. If the economic situation worsens and a crisis ensues the bureaucracy will feel few qualms about ditching Zia. His supporters will find themselves as helpless and vulnerable as did Ayub Khan's supporters in 1968. The bureaucracy will then patch up its differences with the People's Party which is waiting in the wings.

Such an outcome can be avoided and the process of Islamisation accelerated by reducing the power of the bureaucracy, imposing a social isolation upon its leadership and building grass roots political institutions capable of transforming Pakistani society by transferring power from the corrupt policeman and civil servant to dedicated Islamic workers (at the Mohallu and village level) who have demonstrated a capacity for sacrifice and struggle. This is the challenge which confronts General Zia.

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ANTI-PUNJAB FEELINGS IN PAKISTAN

London ARABIA in English No 10, Jun 82 pp 16-17

[Text]  Ever since independence Pakistan's unity has been fractured by disparate political movements. The provinces that constitute Pakistan today have no tradition of political cohesion or ideological homogeneity. They were integrated within the Indian political system for relatively brief periods – under the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb and under the British – but even during these periods they managed to retain a surprisingly high degree of political autonomy.

It was therefore inevitable that the khalafat movement of the 1920s and the Pakistan movement of the 1940s evoked little response in the provinces that are currently included in Pakistan. In the North West Frontier Province Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan's Red Shirt Movement was a staunch ally of the Indian National Congress. In the Punjab the Unionist Party led by Khizr Hayat Tarwana commanded the support of the rural masses and was strongly opposed to the Muslim League. In Sind, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's father, Sir Shahnawaz Bhutto and G M Syed were Jinnah's sworn adversaries. In Baluchistan the Pakistan movement was virtually unknown.

East Bengal was the only province of undivided India in which the pro-Pakistan sentiment of the Muslim masses was never in doubt. In the western provinces the Muslim League succeeded in eroding the mass base of the establishment parties, but the Pakistan movement was too short-lived to create a new political identity. This was reflected most clearly in the fact that the Muslim League could not produce any new leadership in Sind, Punjab and the Frontier provinces. Its leadership in these areas consisted almost entirely of top level defectors from the establishment parties.

The rapid disintegration of the Muslim League during the 1950s provided fresh opportunities for the advocates of provincial auton-

omy. The most successful of these was Sheikh Mujib Rahman, the charismatic Bengali leader whose political career culminated in the secession of Pakistan's eastern wing and in the establishment of the People's Republic of Bangladesh.

The Sheikh's political rhetoric continues to find echoes in the speeches of the autonomy-seeking provincial politicians of West Pakistan. He had argued that the Pakistani political structure permitted the Punjab to exploit East Bengal. Today Khattak Mari and G M Syed level the same accusation against General Zia's administration.

The Bangladesh episode has had both positive and negative effects as far as the autonomy seekers of West Pakistan are concerned. The Sheikh's argument that Bengali poverty was caused by Punjabi exploitation has backfired. Bengal remains desperately poor despite 11 years of independence. Mujib was assassinated in 1975 and his party has lost a lot of political credibility. Its adversaries have accused it of being the instrument of Indian domination. Bangladesh's inability to solve the Ganges Water dispute and India's policing of the Bay of Bengal has convinced many that secession from Pakistan amounts not to national independence but to the acceptance of Indian hegemony.

The fear of foreign domination has proved to be an effective check to the growth of secessionist tendencies in the North West Frontier Province of West Pakistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has resulted in a virtual dismemberment of the autonomy-seeking section of Wali Khan's National Awami Party – until recently the strongest political grouping in that province. The "Pakhtunistan" issue, once capable of arousing considerable emotion, is clearly dead. Islamic forces have staged a spectacular political comeback, evident in the Islami Jamiat Talaba's (Islamic

Student Organisation) clean sweep of all elections in the colleges of Peshawar in 1981.

The Soviet presence in Afghanistan, while posing a threat to Pakistan as a whole, nevertheless effectively reduces the political clout of secessionist factions in Baluchistan. Although in private Mengal, Bizenjo and Mari have expressed discomfort at the prospect of Soviet tutelage, they realise that Soviet support remains crucial for sustaining the efforts of the Baluchistan "liberation" army now encamped in southern Afghanistan, as well as political initiatives within Pakistan.

Secessionist sentiment is stronger within Baluchistan than anywhere else. The Baluchis suffered mass victimisation at the hands of Bhutto's socialist regime which launched a full-scale war on the province during the 1970s. Thousands of Baluchis died and entire encampments were wiped out. Colonisation policies turned the Baluchis into a minority within their own area. Baluchi nationalism has grown in response to the aggression of the Bhutto administration.

In Sind, political expression of secessionist sentiment remains muted. Except for a handful of extremists grouped around Ayaz and Syed, the main body of the Jiya Sindh movement is associated with the People's Party. The Jiya Sindh movement is heterogeneous and amorphous: it has a 'left' wing of Hindu proto-Communists who advocate unity with India, and a 'right' wing of nationalist Waderas preaching regional autonomy. It has produced a sizeable nationalist and secular literature in Sindhi. The movement was most prominent in 1972-73 when "language riots" took place throughout the province. Karachi and Hyderabad - Sind's largest cities - contain organisations promoting "Muhajir chauvinism". The Pakistani Muhajirs consist of two groups: those Muslims who migrated from India after

1947 and those Muslims (known as Biharis) who migrated from Bangladesh. The "Muhajir Chauvinist" organisations are mainly Bihari-based and assert the superiority of central Indian culture. They are accused of preaching hatred of Sindhis. The authors of most of the "progressive" Urdu literature based in Sind are the leaders of such organisations.

Secessionist forces retain strong political bases in Pakistan. They have suffered a temporary setback from the Soviet Union's misadventure in Afghanistan; but an accommodation between the Zia government and the Soviet Union would quickly restore their health. Similarly, an all-party "restoration of democracy" movement would provide fertile ground for these forces. The People's Party is their natural political ally: in concert with the Soviet Union it could quickly create conditions conducive to the triumph of secessionism in either Baluchistan or Sind.


The Zia government remains committed to checking breakaway movements but its policies have had little effect. Islamisation measures have had no impact on the political life of rural communities. This is in sharp contrast to the Iranian experience, where secessionist tendencies have been effectively countered. Thus, in Iranian Baluchistan Maulana Abdolaziz Mollahzadeh's Islamic party has routed its secessionist rivals and rendered substantial assistance to Teheran.

The Islamic parties of Pakistan have had some success in building a new political basis in the North West Frontier Province. In Sind and Baluchistan, Islamic forces remain divided and relatively ineffective. There is a need to strengthen local religious institutions, enhance their political character and establish firm and enduring relationships between the different segments of the Islamic movement throughout Pakistan.

ZIA'S LACK OF CHARISMA EXAMINED

London ARABIA in English No 10, Jun 82 pp 17-18

[Article by Anjum Matin]

[Text]  Zia ul Haq was born in 1924, the son of Akbar Ali, an army clerical officer from Jullundar. Zia joined the British army and was commissioned in 1945. During the second world war he saw service in Burma, Malaya and Indonesia. In 1947 he decided to join the army of the newly created state of Pakistan.

He made steady progress in the Pakistan army. In the early 1960s he was sent to the US for 'advanced training,' a sure sign that the army high command expected him to play a key role in the future. He served during the 1965 war with India as a lieutenant colonel though without any particular distinction. In the early 1970s he went to Jordan and was decorated with the Al Kaukab and the Al Istiqbal medals for services rendered during the 1970 civil war. He also served in the 1971 war with India. In 1972 he was appointed to the post of major general and given the command of an armoured division. In 1975 he became a lieutenant general and a corps commander and in 1976 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto appointed him as army chief of staff, ignoring several more senior officers. A year later Zia toppled Bhutto and seized power in a bloodless coup. He has ruled Pakistan ever since.

Zia has been described as a modest man reluctant to foster a fullblooded dictatorship or institute a personality cult like that built around Ayub Khan. He has clung to power because the political leadership of Pakistan has been judged incapable – by the army and its experts – of maintaining national unity. His repeated postponement of elections have led him to take a series of steps which have consolidated the hold of the army within Pakistan politics.

In March 1977 he announced that elections would be held in 90 days but these were

postponed to permit the completion of judicial proceedings against Bhutto. The political parties within the Pakistan National Alliance collaborated with Zia during this period and a government of national unity was formed. This collapsed after Bhutto's execution in April 1979 and elections were promised for the winter of that year. Procedural wrangles between the parties and the government over the conduct of these elections led to their cancellation. Zia, however, went ahead with local elections. In the Punjab, a majority of those elected were partisans of Bhutto's People's Party: this confirmed Zia in the view that the "time was not ripe for holding elections in the country."

Events during 1980 and 1981 showed that Pakistan's most popular political group, the People's Party, was developing strong links with Pakistan's worst enemy – the Karmal regime in Kabul. The People's Party has systematically whipped up hatred against the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Its leaders developed close links with the USSR and echoed Soviet policy on the Afghan question. It started negotiations with Baluch secessionist movements and made far-reaching political promises. In March 1981 Bhutto's son, Murtuza, launched a successful attack on a Pakistani aircraft which was hijacked to Kabul where the authorities supplied it with arms and fuel.

Zia's response has been to attempt to create his own political party. He took an important step in this direction in January 1982 when he selected 300 politicians to constitute a Federal Advisory Council. It was hoped that government patronage would permit these politicians to acquire status and influence and enable them to destroy the political hold of the Bhutto family. This strategy is not likely to be

particularly successful, however. The political impact of the Federal Council is unlikely to be greater than that of Ayub Khan's Convention Muslim League.

Zia has proved to be an adroit political manager. He has successfully dealt with the civilian politicians and also foiled army coups – the most serious of which was one led by General Chisti in March 1981 with, it has been alleged, the backing of the US State Department. Zia has not developed into a charismatic national leader, however.

This is partly explained by Zia's inability to present a coherent Islamisation policy. Zia's commitment to Islam is not in doubt. He comes from a deeply religious family and leads a pious life. He is strongly influenced by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas's reform movement, the Tablighi Jammaat. The Tablighi Jammaat now enjoys a privileged position in the Pakistan army and almost all the khatibs within the army are recruited from its ranks. Maulana Muhammad Abdul Hai is General Zia's guide and religious mentor.

Zia, however, does not have a clear conception of the processes of Islamisation of society and state. He has placed emphasis on the institution of Islamic laws and a gradual adoption of Islamic economic policies. He has used the existing bureaucratic structures as the main instrument for the implementation of his Islamisation policies. No new popular institutions have been created at the popular level. The mosque has, for example, not been transformed into an institution for mobilising local administration as in Iran. The lives of the ordinary people of Pakistan have not been touched by General Zia's Islamisation initiatives: they regard him as not very different from his oppressive predecessors.

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PAKISTAN TIES WITH MUSLIM WORLD

London ARABIA in English No 10, Jun 82 pp 18-19

[Article by Aslam Abdullah]

[Text]

Ever since its creation Pakistan has recognised in principle the need for strong material and spiritual ties with the Muslim countries. The events of the last 34 years, however, suggest that the government of Pakistan has been more concerned with material relations and has left the responsibility of maintaining spiritual ties to the people.

In 1948 Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, stressed the need for a united front of Muslim countries to make their voice felt in the world.

The Islamic fraternity still remains a dream and relations among the Muslim states are governed by the laws of international diplomacy and economic interests. A momentary phase of Islamic brotherhood was seen when the late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, in his efforts to revive unity amongst the ummah, brought an isolated Bangladesh into the Muslim community.

A meeting between Mujibur Rahman and Ali Bhutto during the 2nd Islamic Summit in Lahore in 1974 demonstrated that Islam, if applied, could be more powerful than the alien ideas prevalent in the Muslim world.

Irrespective of what governments do, Islamicists have shown an eagerness to achieve real Islamic fraternity. In Pakistan, large numbers of people, given an opportunity, would be prepared to fight with their Palestinian brothers.

The assassination of Shaheed Hassan al Banna of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1948 and the hanging of Syed Qutub in Egypt shocked the Pakistani Islamicists. When the Pakistan government passed the death sentence on Maulana Maudoodi, the founder of the Jamaat i Islami, Muslims all over the world protested and were instrumental in influencing the government to withdraw the decision.

A policy of Islamic fraternity and unity could have brought rich political and economic dividends to Pakistan. The practice of Muslim nationalism and mutual material interest has proved useful, however.

During Bhutto's regime Pakistan followed a careful nationalist policy in maintaining friendly ties with the Muslim world. The emphasis was on impartiality and bilateralism. He believed that nationalism in any Muslim state is not antithetical to Islamic solidarity. Such a policy was useful to the extent of evolving a nuclear programme and technical and military cooperation.

President Zia is emphatic about the common platform and common destiny of Muslim countries, but what he means by the common destiny is not clear. If it means material cooperation, then the trend has already been set. Pakistan is now a leading country in the provision of technical assistance and skilled manpower to most of the 45 Muslim states. Nearly 1.5 million Pakistanis are employed abroad in the Muslim world, most of them skilled labourers and professional people.

Trade between Pakistan and the Muslim world is also on the increase. In 1980 the total value of Pakistan's exports to the Muslim world was over \$900m, representing 57 per cent of its total exports. Imports were equivalent to over \$1,000m.

Pakistan has also received generous grants from Muslim countries for economic and relief projects. Over the last decade more than \$3,000m in grants came from the Arab Muslim countries. Recently, the Saudi Oil Minister Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, showed great enthusiasm in helping Pakistan develop energy resources. Kuwait has already promised to assist Pakistan in exploring 10 known oil-bearing regions.

Protocols for cooperation with many Muslim countries also exist. The possibility of manufacturing arms and military equipment in cooperation with Turkey was recently discussed by General Zia and the Turkish head of state General Evren. Saudi Arabia has offered \$500m to help pay for US arms.

In the technical field Pakistan has been helping Muslim states on a number of manufacturing and construction projects. For example, it is helping Saudi Arabia construct a new railway line from Hofuf to Dammam.

Some people believe that material needs and cooperation alone should not be the basis for friendly relations between the Muslim states. It may help Muslim states to strengthen their economic bases, but without establishing spiritual ties their all-round development may lack stability and unity.


Pakistan, so far, has given priority to economic ties, and despite tough competition its cultural relationship with other Muslim states has given it an edge. In the view of many, however, economic ties are not enough.

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SHAHI'S FALL SIGNALS MAJOR POLICY SHIFT

London ARABIA in English No 10, Jun 82 pp 19-20

[Article by Inbisat Ahmad Alvi]

[Text]  The recent resignation of Agha Shahi, Pakistan's external affairs minister, signifies a major shift in the country's foreign policy. Shahi was undoubtedly a sick man – the stated reason for his resignation – but his illness was not the main reason for his departure.

The diary writer of *The Times* of London was not far off the mark when he predicted well before the event Shahi's fall over serious policy differences with General Muhammad Zia ul Haq. Shahi had long favoured and pursued an entente cordiale with India and the Soviet Union. While the need to normalise relations with the two giant neighbours is widely felt in Pakistan, few wish to continue to proffer the olive branch in the absence of a positive response from New Delhi and Moscow. Shahi, his critics say, was incurably optimistic about the prospects for rapprochement.

In the foreign ministry and the armed forces many disagreed with what they regarded as a policy of "appeasement." Nevertheless, Shahi continued to be the prime mover of Pakistani diplomacy and his continued influence on General Zia had begun to rattle the hardliners. It was under pressure from them that Zia agreed to relieve Shahi of his post.

Shahi has, however, been spared the disgrace a man of his stature would normally face in the event of a fall. The regime has not disputed the "ill health" theory of his departure for two reasons. First, whatever views Shahi held of relations with India and the Soviet Union, he was a respected figure in the bureaucracy and diplomatic circles of the country: his graceful fall is a tribute to the services rendered by him as a civil servant for more than four decades. The second reason is more political – to make the changes in foreign

policy that will follow look less obvious.

Shahi's years in office saw the decline of Pakistan as a regional power following its decisive defeat in the Bangladesh war with India in 1971. One can still recall the Ayub Khan years when as far back as 1964 Pakistan received military assistance from both the US and the USSR, surpassed the much bigger armed forces of India in fire power, maintained a steady level of economic growth, and stood almost on a par with India in prestige at world forums, despite Pakistan's membership of Seato and Cento.

Pakistan is now non-aligned and yet despised by the Russians and often also mistrusted by its erstwhile western allies. For the Russians, some observers believe, it is the last domino of Islam that must fall if they are to ensure Soviet hegemony in the area, leading to supremacy over the Gulf and the Middle East. Washington is apprehensive of Pakistan because of its nuclear capability. The powerful Israeli lobby in the US anticipates danger in this for the safety of Israel. A side effect of this interplay of forces has been the growth of Indo-Israeli collaboration in nuclear technology. Since India also has the advantage of the military and economic support conferred by its friendship treaty with the USSR, it has finally emerged as the sole guarantor of the regional balance of power in South Asia.

Shahi belonged to the small but influential group of ideologues at the Pakistani foreign office who acknowledged this pre-eminent position of India and favoured a policy of adjustment with the "new South Asian realities." This tacit surrender to Indian hegemony also meant a docile attitude towards the Soviet Union.

The decline of Pakistan in regional and world affairs was no accident of history.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the last elected ruler of Pakistan, may well have been an important factor in this respect from the time he became foreign minister of Pakistan under Ayub Khan. Bhutto, who was inspired by the idea of abandoning the regional status of Pakistan, should bear high responsibility for the involvement of his country in two wars with India, first under Ayub Khan and then under Yahya Khan, believing that the Chinese were ready to support Pakistan.

In 1965 Lyndon Johnson, then Democratic president of the US, coerced Pakistan into negotiating an armistice in the first war. A shaken Ayub Khan went to Tashkent in the Soviet Union to conclude a peace treaty with Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri. The agreement was widely unpopular in Pakistan and in 1969 Ayub Khan resigned after a wave of discontent whipped up by Bhutto, who had earlier dissociated himself from Ayub.

In 1971 India could chop off Pakistan's eastern wing and convert it into Bangladesh. Yahya Khan stepped down in the aftermath of the debacle. After six years of trial, tribulation and ceaseless opportunism, Bhutto became president of Pakistan. Under him a new equation was struck with India at the Simla conference with Mrs Indira Gandhi.

This perhaps explains New Delhi's lingering nostalgia for Bhutto. *Blitz*, a pro-establishment Indian newsweekly known for its pro-Soviet views, once described him as "the most potent ally that India can have in the world." His death by hanging was a widely mourned loss in New Delhi.

General Zia has sought a departure from Bhutto's foreign policy paradigms. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan Zia has resolutely identified with the interests of the Muslim Afghan people. More than two million refugees now shelter in Pakistan. Support for the Afghan cause has been solicited from Muslim countries as well as from the US which has promised a \$3bn loan to buy arms.

The increased availability of military assistance has served to estrange India which has

attempted to counter Pakistani arms acquisition by striking a similar deal with the Soviet Union. Considerable progress was made on this question during the recent visit of the Soviet Defence Minister Dimitri Ustinov and the Soviet army and navy chiefs to New Delhi.

Despite increasing Indo-Soviet military collaboration Mrs Gandhi has sought to distance herself from the Soviet Union's Afghanistan policy. She has cautiously welcomed General Zia's 1981 proposal for a "no war" pact between India and Pakistan. After Agha Shahi's departure from office, enthusiasm for the no war initiative waned in both New Delhi and Islamabad.


In 1982 Pakistan moved closer to the Iranian position on the Afghan question. Iran's Afghanistan plan presented in November 1981 calls for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the deployment of an Islamic peace-keeping force and the establishment of an international council of ulema charged with the establishment of a provisional Islamic government. Elements within this plan have been endorsed in joint communiques in both Islamabad and New Delhi during visits of the Iranian foreign minister in 1982.

The notion of a rapprochement with Pakistan is widely popular in India. Pakistan's stand on Afghanistan has found support from unexpected quarters in India. Those who favour Pakistan against Mrs Indira Gandhi include sections of the militant Bhartiya Janata Party and the main opposition that it is only Mrs Gandhi's personal dislike of Zia, a vested interest in keeping the Indo-Pakistani hostilities alive, and Russia's strong hold over Indian affairs gained in 1970 that is preventing the normalisation of relations.

Such a normalisation will almost certainly lead to a reduction of superpower influence in the subcontinent and therefore will be strongly resisted by the USSR which has most at stake in this part of the world. Further, normalisation will also require a just and long-term solution of the Kashmir dispute which has soured Indo-Pakistani relations since independence in 1947.

DANGERS SEEN IN PAKISTAN'S ECONOMY

London ARABIA in English No 10, Jun 82 pp 20-21

[Text]  The Zia government prides itself on its economic performance. It claims that the Pakistani economy is in the process of fundamental restructuring. As against the "dark days" of Bhutto's mismanagement a new, rational, pragmatic approach has been adopted and, it is claimed, this is already bearing fruit. Whereas during the period 1971-77 real Gross National Product increased at an annual rate of 4.88 per cent, the rate of growth of real GNP during 1977-1981 has been as high as 6.76 per cent. Significant improvement has been recorded in both agricultural and industrial production.

However, an impartial reading of official statistics (see box) does not give evidence of fundamental restructuring. The Pakistan economy remains agrarian-based with an inordinately bloated service and public administration sector. Its international vulnerabilities are perhaps more evident today than ever before. The country continues to live well beyond its means. External indebtedness continues to mount. Dependence on foreign aid and on the continuing flow of foreign remittances remains pronounced. The ratio of savings to GNP remains modest – although significant gains have been made in this respect during the past 4½ years. Inflation remains an acute reality. The volume of monetary assets increased from Rs22,059m in 1972 to 1973, to Rs51,773m in 1977 and to Rs103,997m in 1981.

It is claimed that the main difference in the economic performance of the People's Party and the military administration lies in the latter's ability to restore economic stability and infuse a feeling of confidence among private sector investors. The economic philosophy of the Zia administration may be summed up in the phrase "back to the golden sixties" when Ayub Khan's "growthmanship" brought about an economic "miracle" hailed by Harvard developmentalists as conclusive proof of the superiority of the doctrines of laissez-faire and

market rationality.

The economic policy of the Zia administration places emphasis on revitalising the private sector and making it the main motive force behind the nation's economic expansion. Much attention has been paid to the task of fostering a favourable socio-economic environment and on encouraging the growth of both domestic and foreign private sector investment. Liberal tax concessions have been extended to private enterprise and despite a generally tight monetary policy the banks have been encouraged to be generous as far as their lending policies to the private sector industrial enterprises are concerned.

The difference between private corporate sector investment and saving has continued to grow throughout the past 4½ years. Despite this the performance of the private sector has been disappointing – particularly in terms of its contribution to domestic capital formation. Under the Zia government public sector savings as a proportion of GNP have increased from 1.71 per cent in 1977 to 4.07 in 1981. Against this, private sector savings have fallen from 11.21 per cent of GNP in 1977 to 8.79 per cent in 1981. The average private sector saving to GNP ratio was 8.51 per cent in the Bhutto period and 9.84 per cent under General Zia. On the other hand, the private investment to GNP ratio was 4.8 per cent in the Bhutto era and 4.7 per cent during the military administration.

Thus, despite a marginal improvement in terms of saving, the private sector remains as unwilling to invest its resources today as it was during the days of Bhutto. As a senior official of the prestigious National Bank of Pakistan told me: "The private sector investment boom seems to have effectively petered out. Although desirous of extracting the last ounce of concession from the government, the private sector is becoming increasingly reluctant to risk its money in Pakistan." It prefers to

transfer resources to lucrative Middle Eastern markets, and to numbered Swiss accounts or to indulge in conspicuous consumption.

This is, after all, a reversion to the policies of the "good old days" of Ayub Khan when capitalist "robber barons" reaped the benefits of government patronage without exposing their own funds to risks of loss and mismanagement. Then, as now, deficit financing and the expansion of bank credit were the main sustainers of industrial growth. The reluctance of the private sector to finance economic expansion is graphically illustrated by the fact that the rate of growth of time deposits at the scheduled banks has been falling since 1977. In 1980-81, whereas real GNP grew by 5.5 per cent, time deposits increased by only 3.12 per cent.

It is clear, therefore, that government initiatives to stimulate private sector expansion cannot be described as very effective. A return to the economic policies of Ayub Khan has ensured that the chaos and confusion characteristic of the last days of the Bhutto regime are no longer a feature of Pakistan's economic life. The economy, however, remains exposed to all the dangers that beset – and ultimately destroyed – Ayub Khan's economic strategy. Chief among these is the gradual erosion of the real income of the urban poor and the fixed income groups.

It was expected that the Islamisation programme of the government would make a contribution to income redistribution. The measure likely to have the most pronounced impact on the pattern of income distribution is the introduction of zakat. But total zakat collections have been trivial – they represented 2.17 per cent of total government revenue for the fiscal year 1980-81. It has been estimated that zakat collections can enable the government to increase the transfer of resources to those living below the poverty line by just Rs45 a year – less than 1.5 per cent of the national per capita income. Thus, the implementation of the zakat ordinance has proved to be ineffective as a means of reducing income disparities.

Interest-free loans provided to students, small farmers and fishermen and first-time house buyers are also insignificant – as is the entire profit and loss sharing experiment, whereby people are encouraged to put money into new profit and loss deposit and savings accounts and to invest in participation term-certificates and modaraba certificates. Funds mobilised under the profit and loss sharing scheme represented about 3.5 per cent of the total bank deposits in the country.

Islamisation is thus ineffective as a means for alleviating poverty deprivation. It was

originally hoped that Islamisation would be a means for "disciplining the masses." In August 1978 when the Pakistan National Alliance was taken into government, Dr Meenai, an ex-deputy governor of the Pakistan Central Bank and a close confidant of Ghulam Ishak Khan, the federal finance minister, told me: "The politicians should prepare the people for material sacrifices. This is essential for our economic recovery." But ordinary people cannot be persuaded to tighten their belts when the military and bureaucratic top brass live in luxury in palatial residences, surrounded by hosts of servants and free to accumulate money outside the country. The Alliance politicians fell from favour because they demanded restrictions on the corrupt bureaucratic and military administrators and advocated changes that would have benefited the poor. Today the role of "disciplining the masses" has been assigned to the president's hand-picked Federal Council. These men owe their political eminence to the bureaucracy and they can be expected to be loyal and complacent.

It is evident that the poor people of Pakistan can put little faith in this current bunch of yes-men, and as their economic conditions deteriorate resentment and frustration will mount. A crucial factor is the favourable weather conditions that have sustained high levels of agricultural production during the last three years. Bad weather and crop failures can swiftly destroy the air of relative stability that prevails in the economy and create pressures similar to those experienced during the last days of Ayub Khan.

The economic establishment in Pakistan remains largely unconcerned. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the "back to Ayub Khan" movement is the rapidity with which a second generation of Harvard-trained developmentalists has emerged to seize control of the levers of economic decision-making. This is reflected in the rise of Dr Mahbub al Haq, who is back from the World Bank as the new deputy chairman at the planning ministry and the re-establishment of Dr Navab Haider Naqui, now director of the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE).

In Ayub Khan's day PIDE occupied pride of place within the economic bureaucracy. Today it is well on the way to regaining its former eminence. All its eight senior economists are American trained. Its research programme centres on building macro-economic models and input-output tables popular in Pakistan during the early 1960s. Its publications are replete with the themes and clichés currently fashionable in American academia. It is thus natural that PIDE is not concerned with

questions of institutional change or the restructuring of economic relationships within the country.

It is thus clear that a reassuring chorus of applauding professionals has quickly gathered to provide encouragement to economic policy-makers bent on reviving Ayub Khan's teachings. The events of the late 1960s have shown how ineffective these "model builders" prove to be when foreign support is withdrawn and domestic economic conditions deteriorate. Ayub Khan's political inheritors feel that they can rely on rising levels of economic assistance – particularly from the Arab countries. But if these Arab donors realise that the economic policies of the Zia government are as vulnerable as those of Ayub Khan, they may feel compelled to re-examine their attitude towards the present rulers of Pakistan.

Figures Behind the Economic Facts

During the Bhutto administration the share of agriculture in the Gross Domestic Production fell from 34.76 per cent to 31.57 per cent. This trend was maintained during the last four years when the share of agriculture in GDP fell to 29.96 per cent. The share of manufacturing in GDP remained constant at about 16.6 per cent throughout the period 1972-81. Services and public administration and defence constituted 14.08 per cent of GDP in 1971. By 1977 this had increased to 16.12 per cent, and by 1981 to 16.10 per cent.

The deficit on the current account of the balance of payments continued to deteriorate throughout the period of the Bhutto and Zia governments. In 1972 this deficit amounted to Rs33,600m. By 1977 the deficit had increased to Rs89,350m. By 1980 the current account deficit was of the order of Rs86,350m. The worsening current account deficit has led to the decision to sever the link between the rupee and the US dollar. This move is likely to lead to a significant devaluation of the Pakistani currency against the dollar.

Foreign remittances, however, increased significantly in the last decade. In 1972 net factor income from abroad was less than one per cent of the country's export receipts. By 1981 net factor income from abroad had increased to the equivalent of 48 per cent of Pakistan's export earnings. During Bhutto's administration foreign remittances increased tenfold. In the past four years net factor income from abroad has increased by a factor of 3.7. The country's terms of trade have worsened under both governments. Prices have increased: The wholesale price index increased from 128.63 in 1972 to 255.27 in 1977 and to 355.02 in 1981. Government development expenditure increased by a factor of 5.8 under Bhutto and by 0.5 under General Zia. Foreign governmental aid has been high under both regimes. This is reflected in the fact that the net external resource inflow increased from Rs1,495m in 1972-73 to Rs5,050m in 1977 and to Rs9,570m in 1980-81.

CSO: 4220/242

IMPACT OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY FAILURE

Karachi JANG in Urdu 24 May 82 p 34

[Text] According to a front page report in a daily on 1 May, 1982, Mr Ishrat Ali, presidential adviser on domestic trade, while talking to newsmen in Lahore, said that there will be a decrease of 30 to 35 percent in the spring crop (as compared to government estimates done earlier). Mr Ishrat Ali attributed it to the lack of rain on time and inclement weather. He further added that the crops have been poor in the areas of Mianwali and Sargodha. He assured that there would not be a need for importing grains except for some lentils.

Our benefactors and respected rulers, and our bigger benefactors, the U.S., the World Bank, et al, exhort us to remain an agricultural country and not try to be industrialized.

The state of affairs of our rural areas is such that there are 1 million non-landholding families. Families holding 3-4 acres are 2,750,000 and they own 30 percent of the total arable land. Two million and two hundred thousand are sharecropping families, who work on the lands of large landholders. The large landholders, whose number is not more than 3,000 or 4,000, own 50 percent of the total arable land.

First of all, farming is not feasible on small plots of land, and secondly, small farmers, because of their limited resources, cannot use fertilizers. Ironically, they farm fodder during spring and plant an acre or so with wheat for their own family. They try to eke out a living by raising a couple cattle and some chickens, and selling milk, butter, eggs, etc. For this state of affairs, the 30 percent arable land of the country contributes zero to the total national agricultural output.

The large landowners own about 50 percent of the nation's arable land. Among them are also civil servants and army officers. Many landowners except for some civil servants and army officers, get their land cultivated by the sharecroppers actually living on the land. These sharecroppers, because of their limited resources and techniques, do not receive the optimum yield from these lands.

Now, the remaining total acreage of 18 to 20 percent, is owned by landholders holding 25 to 30 acres who are relatively well off. Since they do the farming

themselves, their yield of wheat is 50 to 60 maunds per acre instead of the usual 20 to 25.

This brief summary indicates that the land ownership structure is the biggest hurdle in the optimum yield. The land owned by 2,750,000 families cannot yield good crops because of the small size of the plots. And the yield on the land of large landowners could not be good because they are too busy in their lives of luxury. This is why many farsighted and patriotic elements have been asking for revolutionary land reforms, but to no avail since many large landowners are the ones who hold positions in the ministries, embassies and other important offices.

Besides the ownership structure problem, one of the biggest problems is water-logging and salinity, which has enveloped a large acreage of our arable land. This can be controlled cheaply by digging small ditches and pooling water in them, but the present system of landownership prohibits any such steps. This problem may overtake a considerable part of our land in the next 10 or 20 years and it points to the need for reform in the ownership structure.

The third important issue is irrigation. In Punjab, where the water table is fairly high, this problem can be solved by drilling the wells. But, again, the cost of drilling the wells is prohibitive. An individual family cannot afford to engage in that venture. It should come under the domain of the public sector. But it would not be possible until, once again, the land ownership structure is reformed.

Large landowners acquire water through their influence but the small farmers remain deprived of needed water, which results in poor crops. Another problem is the flooding of the land with salt water, especially in Sind, resulting in spoiling the land. This is attributed to the rivers not falling in the ocean with enough force and resulting in the seepage of salt water inland, especially near Ghulam Mohammed Barrage.

Because of this structure of ownership, there is poverty in our country, and because of poverty there is a lack of demand for consumer goods like shoes and cloth. For instance, there are only 3 and 1/2 million spindles (spinning wheels) but, as is well-known, half of the textile mills are closed.

In good times we used to manufacture 14 yards of cloth per head and exported a major portion of it and yet it was hard to sell the rest in the domestic market. Its main cause was the lack of purchasing power among the masses, which is the result of the ownership structure.

There is only one way for the development of the country and the well-being of the people of Pakistan: basic reforms in the ownership structure, which will lead to the desired goals of progress.

9859

CSO: 4203/139

PAKISTAN

BRIEFS

MURTAZA BHUTTO TOUR--Peshawar, 5 Jul (PPI)--Murtaza Bhutto, the leader of the so-called al-Zulfiqar, has recently toured several countries of Europe and Africa. Reliable reports indicate that Murtaza Bhutto, who last year married the daughter of an Afghan foreign service official in Kabul and has had a child from the marriage toured several countries recently. His wife, in order to join her husband during the tour, had left Afghanistan 2 months earlier. However, when she returned to Kabul she was accompanied by a child she had borne during the tour. It is interesting to note that following the example of his elder brother, the younger Shahnawaz Bhutto also married, probably into the same family into which Murtaza Bhutto married. It seems that either the two girls are closely related or they come from the same family. The girls seem to be close friends. According to the reports, Murtaza Bhutto first visited Libya where he met with terrorist groups and also held secret talks with Libyan officials. It is worth noting that, after security measures taken by the Pakistani Government following the assassination of Choudhury Zahoor Elahi, terrorist activities in Pakistan have become almost nil. [Text] [GF121859 Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 6 Jul 82 p 1]

HAQ LETTER ON LEBANON--President Gen Mohammad Ziaul Haq has said that President Reagan has assured him that the United States is taking all necessary measures to restore peace in Lebanon. He was replying to a question by journalists at a Ramadan fast-breaking party in Rawalpindi last evening concerning the response to his letter to the heads of state and government of the five permanent member countries of the UN Security Council. The president, in identical letters sent on 7 July, urged these leaders to use their power and influence to stop Israel from pursuing its genocidal war in Lebanon and withdraw from that country. General Mohammad Ziaul Haq said he received a prompt response from President Reagan on 9 July in reply to his letter. Concerning the report submitted by the Council of Islamic Ideology concerning the future political structure of the country, the president said it was being referred back to the council for the submission of concrete proposals that could be implemented. He said the report had enunciated certain principles but not proposed any specific mechanism. [Text] [BK160716 Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 0200 GMT 16 Jul 82]

MUSLIM JOINT DEFENSE PLAN--Federal Minister for Information and Broadcasting Raja Mohammad Zafarul Haq has said that Pakistan must strengthen and consolidate its defense and economic potential not only to safeguard its own territorial and ideological frontiers, but also to prove itself to be a strong fortress of Islam in a real sense. He was speaking at a meeting organized in Lahore to protest the naked Israeli aggression in Lebanon. The information minister repeated the proposal discussed by President Mohammad Ziaul Haq for the joint defense of the Islamic block and said this is the only way to face threats posed by the expansionist neo-imperialism of Israel to the Muslim world. He said the past experience has proved that we have to strengthen our defense capability, keeping in mind that nobody from the outside will come to our aid to defend the independence which we achieved through the sincere efforts and sacrifices of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. [Text] [BK200745 Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 0200 GMT 20 Jul 82]

PLEA FOR LIFTING RESTRICTIONS--The former Minister of Information and Broadcasting Mahmud Azam Faruqi has condemned the restriction on Khan Abdul Wali Khan and his wife's entering Sind. He said it is a strange thing that on the one hand the federal government provides him with every facility and does not hinder Khan Abdul Wali Khan's going to Kabul, and even welcomes him despite his having had behind-the-scenes talks and discussions on internal matters with the puppet government there, and on the other hand the provincial government of Sind does not even want Khan Abdul Wali Khan to enter the province. In another statement he added that Pakistan is one country, and it is the Islamic and fundamental right of every citizen here that he be able to go without hindrance from one part to another. Not to grant this right of the citizens is to violate the fundamental principles of Islam, the hollow slogans of which are continually raised in the halls of government night and day. He said that if the character and freedom of Wali Khan or any other citizen is contrary to the interest of the country, then without doubt it is the duty of the government to start a case against him, prove the accusations, and give punishment. But no civilized government has the right to deprive any citizen of his fundamental rights and deny his freedom to come and go within the country, unless it fulfills the obligations of the law, morality and Islam. He asked that the Government of Sind rescind this order and display justice and magnanimity. [Text] [Rawalpindi TAMEER in Urdu 14 Jun 82 p 4]

IRAQ, ALGERIA, PLO AMBASSADORS--The outgoing ambassadors of Iraq, Algeria and the Palestine Liberation Organization paid farewell calls on President Gen Mohammad Ziaul Haq in Rawalpindi on 13 July. They discussed with the president matters of mutual interest. Foreign Secretary Niaz A. Naik was also present at the meetings. [Text] [BK141445 Karachi Domestic Service in English 1700 GMT 13 Jul 82 BK]

PACT WITH INDIA--Federal Minister for Information and Broadcasting Raja Mohammad Zafarul Haq has said that the efforts being made by the government for a no-war pact between Pakistan and India are based on its desire to preserve its national interest through diplomatic channels. Addressing a meeting in Karachi this morning organized by the Istehkam-i-Pakistan Council, he said the agreement will be beneficial to and in the interest of both countries. Raja Mohammad Zafarul Haq said a section of the people in India also realizes the importance of friendly relations between the two countries due to the changed geopolitical situation. The minister declared that the government has not and will never compromise on its principles in reaching any agreement. [Text] [BK191343 Karachi Domestic Service in English 1005 GMT 19 Jul 82]

MOVE TO ARM CIVILIANS HIT

Cebu City VISAYAN HERALD in English 29 Jun 82 pp 1, 2

[Article by Mike Yncino]

[Text] The formation of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) in Cebu province met stiff disapproval from the opposition Pilipino Democratic Party (PDP).

The PDP thru Ribomapil Holganza, Deputy General Secretary for the group, assailed yesterday the formation of the CHDF as allegedly an opportunity for political warlords here to justify the presence of their para-military units. Holganza claimed that the said paramilitary units or "private armies" of the same political lords in the Province were never disbanded even after the imposition of Martial Law.

According to Holganza, despite the protestations by the authorities for the disbandment of the said para-military groups upon the declaration of martial rule, they were merely made to lie low and called upon by their masters to function as their goons during elections.

Holganza expressed fear that the said private armies of these politicians would be inducted as CHDF's. The opposition leader said that the military would be courting more complexities and would compound the problem in the mountain barangays if it pursues the plan of arming civilians or authorizing private armies of their friends and patrons, to carry firearms. He also said that it will only widen the chasm between the government and our mountain folks and would be a burden to the residents in the affected areas of the province.

At the same time, the opposition stalwart criticized the civilian government here for its alleged apathy and neglect to the simple demands of the people. He also expressed surprise that the government machinery under the administration would only act after a major crisis has occurred. "From the experience we have had with the present regime, we have learned that our people have to assert, struggle and fight in order that the wheels of justice, equity, and fairness would move, Holganza concluded.

CSO: 4220/240

TACLOBAN LEADER ATTACKS GOVERNMENT

Cebu City VISAYAN HERALD in English 29 Jun 82 pp 1, 4

[Text] An opposition leader from Tacloban City has revealed the hardship of airing criticisms against the government in the province of Leyte.

Tente Quintero who is former vice mayor of the City of Tacloban and who is now leading the political opposition in that city revealed to Visayan Herald that the atmosphere in Leyte is still very oppressive.

Quintero, however, praised the people of Leyte for knowing the bad things in the government.

The Leyte opposition leader pointed out that in the last barangay election, more new barangay officials were elected. They replaced old ones who belonged to the circle of the party in power. Quintero said 65% composed the new barangay officials in Leyte who go elected. Most of them, he said, were independents and opposition men.

But in Leyte-Samar, about 85% were new barrio officials, Quintero revealed.

This proves, Quintero said, that the people are not sleeping.

CSO: 4220/240

EDITORIAL OPPOSES ARMING CIVILIANS

Cebu City VISAYAN HERALD in English 29 Jun 82 p 4

[Editorial]

[Text] Despite reports of NPA presence in the mountain areas of Cebu, the mention of arming civilians through the CHDF brings fear and uncertainty to one's mind.

If we trace the present attitude of government, government believes that it is not through armalites that the mounting problems of our people can be solved. When martial law was imposed, all guns were decreed for surrender and the government saw to it that all military hardware in the hands of civilians were duly collected by the military.

The CHDF concept operates through the distribution of guns so the civilians can protect themselves. Guns will be in the possession of civilians, or barangay officials such as the tanods, after being furnished basic training by the military. Despite this little training, some uncertainty can not be prevented from creeping into the minds of those who believe that there could be better ways of solving the NPA threat than the use of arms through the CHDF concept.

Arms in the hands of civilians might become a monster harder to control later on. The suggestion for the military to put up detachments where they are most-needed should be tried. Professionally-trained military men are better prepared to face rebellion than plain civilians under the guise of untested barangay tanods.

CSO: 4220/240

SIGNS OF WEAKENING ECONOMY EXAMINED

Cebu City VISAYAN HERALD in English 30 Jun, 1 Jul 82

[Article by Eddie R. Gandionco]

[30 Jun 82 p 7]

[Text] The Administration's economic forecasts for this year is on the firing line. No one in business and industry really takes the bright and rosy forecast pictured by key members of the Administration seriously. After all, the economy failed to improve in the first half, instead interest rates rocketed into the stratosphere.

Bad spots in the economy are becoming more apparent, and more plentiful. A strong drop in retail sales and lower-than-normal construction activity helped to push sales down. Even more important, business and industry reports indicate a further decline of real growth in the second or third quarter, and possibly both.

Vehicle sales has dropped considerably; unemployment has kept rising; retail sales and income lost momentum; most manufacturers production actually fell. All in all, the real Gross National Product (GNP) is down from the 1981 level.

At this writing, very little is known of our traditional exports performance. The price of copper, value-wise, is the lowest ever experienced by us since 1932. And there are indications that copper prices will not go up until the last quarter of 1983 unless a major war will break-out this year. The same signs goes with our other traditional exports such as coco oil, sugar, lumber or logs, etc. In addition, we are incurring huge deficits monthly, not to mention, our burgeoning external debt of \$18 billion US dollars, excluding interests.

Since those signs are widely known, disbelief has to be ruled out. The most plausible explanation of our economic situation today is that the prospect of continued high inflation is even more alarming than the prospect of weak growth. In short, the inflation picture has hardly improved. And I hope that the key members of the Administration will be frank enough to accept this and to tell the truth. Such candor will be greatly appreciated by the citizenry that they will be ready to pay the price for any government move that will improve the economy.

The prospect of a price acceleration is understandable, considering that inflation has trended up for a decade now. And this fact persisted in the face of President Marcos when he directed all government officials to cutdown on all unnecessary government spending, including out-of-town travels, and only broken by so many Administration officials.

I have observed that the Administration's economic experts and technocrats are more concerned with real growth than inflation. They believe that giving short-run priority to cut inflation will serve to bolster real economic growth in the long run. I am not an economist, however, I believe that bolstering short-run growth in favor of attacking first inflation will doom to fail, as the record of the recent past proves. When will our government economists and technocrats ever learn of their past mistakes? If our policymakers follow the logic of these technocrats, then Heaven help us from continued high inflation.

[1 Jul 82 p 7]

[Text] Inflation should be the number one worry of the Administration. Success in curbing inflation will be furthered by the current state of the economy. Given the margin of slack, inflationary pressures should not heat up significantly even as the process of economic recovery continues. This gives the Administration and the Batasang Pambansa the courage and guts to do everything within their power to lower inflation, even if government policies take a toll in terms of slower growth.

Over the past few months, the stocks market have fallen. This is an important sign to how investors feel about the economic outlook. One reading says that the stocks market is cowed by the size of government deficits and by the Administration's policies, that it expects to be hit from two sides. The stocks market shock has begin to show up elsewhere in the economy. The way the stocks market is behaving has caused great concern to business and industry. However, if the market will see signs that monetary policy will stabilize for a long time to come, expect the stocks market situation to change abruptly. The next few months are particularly crucial in this regard. The imponderable is whether the market will get back on its feet merrily or stay as is now.

The Administration has put forward a comprehensive plan for solving the problem that plague our economy--the Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK). The program is so deceptively simple in approach that it seems to have left most economic analysts hopelessly confused. Stripped down to its bare bones, the KKK will create as many livelihood centers in all barangays and thus prime pumping more money into the rural areas. Critics of the KKK have focused largely on the portion of ever-increasing money supply which will produce more inflation. In its most basic form, the argument is that higher government spending causes higher prices. If the government does not have enough money to spend for essential services, where does it hope to get money to finance KKK in all barangays?

Ruling out pennies from heaven, there are only two possibilities. Either the government prints more money or increase taxes. In the first possibility, the government will merely substitute an implicit tax for an explicit one,

with individuals who hold money now bearing the burden. In the second, it will cut down inflation. The monetary alternative is inflationary; the tax increase alternative is not. The second, therefore, is the key to finance the KKK program.

As President Marcos stressed time and again, that the critical nature of the KKK cannot be overemphasized. What is at stake is not only increase in national productivity but also generation of jobs and income for all Filipinos. That the country and the people will stand to gain unprecedented benefits in the years to come because of KKK.

CSO: 4220/240

OPPOSITION GOVERNOR FAVORS PARLIAMENTARY STRUGGLE

Cebu City VISAYAN HERALD in English 5 Jul 82 pp 1, 2

[Article by Al Alinsug]

[Text]

Misamis Or. Governor Honobono Adaza still believes in parliamentary struggle in order to liberate this country from the clutches of the Marcos regime.

Gov. Adaza expressed this sentiment during an interview over the weekend with the members of the Cebu Tri-Media Association (CTMA) at an uptown restaurant.

"If I don't believe any more in parliamentary struggle, you can be sure I'll be too honest by resigning as governor of Mis. Or.," he said.

Adaza said he does not foresee it coming. "I don't think I should involve the people of my province in a fratricidal fight if I decide to fight in some other level," he said.

Among other things, the outspoken Misamis Or. provincial executive and leader of the Mindanao Alliance debunked the promise of former Sen. Benigno Aquino who pledged recently to come back to the Philippines through the backdoor.

(Aquino was reported planning to come home through the backdoor when former Cong. Antonio Cuenco saw Aquino in the U.S., Visayan Herald, June 28, 1982)

On the Aquino promise, Adaza said he "does not believe in promises, especially political promises."

Explaining the role of Ninoy Aquino in the opposition, Adaza expressed the observation that it is doubtful if Aquino will have the necessary following in case he comes through the backdoor.

Adaza reasoned out that Ninoy is not the only opposition leader or group in the struggle against Marcos. "The people have struggled against Marcos," Adaza said.

In the differences that opposition leaders have at present, Adaza opined that there is the necessity of sitting down together, including Aquino, to formulate a "grand strategy, and it's about time."

"But I don't think promises of that kind (referring to Aquino's promise) will go far," the articulate Mindanao opposition leader said.

Although Adaza was critical of the other opposition groups in Mindanao, he has not discounted the possibility of burying personal differences in the greater interest of the Filipino people.

"The transcendental inter-

est of the people is our goal," Adaza declared.

However, Adaza did not think much of the leadership of Cagayan de Oro City Mayor Aquilino Pimente; or that of Assemblyman Reuben Canoy with whom he admitted to have personal differences "because they have none, or are still vague since they are still in the process of organizing themselves," Adaza stated.

Adaza has accused Canoy of making arrangements with the party in power in order to reach recognition as second to KBL, but "one can not achieve to be a genuine opposition through this means," Adaza pointed out.

CSO: 4220/240

MILITARY-OPPOSITION COOPERATION FORGED

Cebu City VISAYAN HERALD in English 5 Jul 82 pp 1, 4

[Article by Mike Yncino]

[Text]

The unity and cooperation between the military establishment and some members of the opposition is seen after RECOM 7 PC-INP Commander, Brig. General Alfredo Olano reportedly exerted efforts for the purpose. The RECOM 7 chief has been reportedly with members of the opposition here and has been heard saying that he is open to cooperation by oppositionists for the common good of the people in this region.

This move of the Regional Commander has been noted by some observers as a brilliant political maneuver to cushion the impact on some criticisms against members of the military as well as of the administration.

One such meeting which happened yesterday afternoon between members of Cebu's mass media and an opposition leader at one of the restaurants here seems to give credence to the said theory. The meeting between Olano, the media men and Andy Corominas, an oppositionist, was both cordial and friendly. It touched on the burning issues of the day even as Lawyer Migs Enri-

quez, radio-commentator Vic Abangan, this writer and the ladies of the two radiomen were also on hand to give suggestions and additions to the topics discussed.

The RECOM 7 Commander reiterated his pledge to open the door of cooperation to all citizens of Central Visayas for the common weal of the country and our people. Olano is apparently out to ask oppositionists for a joint thrust for the development of the Region in all aspects of life.

Gen. Olano said that he, being a former shoe shine boy, is concerned for the people in the mountains. He said he will press the issue with Mayors and the Provincial Governor to ask them in today's meeting with him at the Governor's office what they have done for their constituents especially those in far flung barangays. The military brass was reacting to a question raised during the meeting if the military is not going to pressure the civilian governments concerned to start real viable livelihood projects for the area including the repair and or construction of roads in the same area.

He said that he will discuss with the mayors and other civil servants what could be done to solve the problem here believed to be mainly economic.

According to Olano, as Filipinos, whether we belong to the KBL or the oppositionists or the dissidents, we should all cooperate with each other to bring about the same objective we have for the benefit of the people. Olano urged a dignified relationship with leaders and members of the opposition and members of the mass media with the military to realize the same objectives sought for.

CSO: 4220/240

CABINET APPROVES CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

Colombo THE ISLAND in English 8 Jul 82 p 1

[Article by Prasad Gunewardene]

[Text]

An amendment to the Constitution approved by the Cabinet yesterday, indicates that the Presidential Election will be held before the General Election.

Among seven major changes in legislation approved yesterday, the restriction on the President seeking a mandate before the expiry of the term of his office was very significant. Under the proposed amendment, provision will be made to enable the President to call for Presidential elections in time after four years of his assumption of office, but the new President will assume office only on February 4, after the election.

President Jayewardene was sworn in as President on February 4 1978. When the amendment is incorporated in the Constitution, President Jayewardene will have powers to hold a Presidential election immediately, if necessary.

Another major change in legislation is that the time between the proclamation of an election and nomination day to be one week and between nomination day and election day to be between 2 to 4 weeks. With most opposition parties in disarray, this amendment

will leave little room for manoeuvre in case of a snap election being called.

Other major recommendations approved by the Cabinet for the preparation of legislation are:

1) A person who has been deprived of civic rights by a Special Presidential Commission to be subject to no further disqualification. Any person making use of a person who had lost civic rights during an election to be deemed to have committed a corrupt practice. On an injunction being applied for in the Court of Appeal in this regard during the course of an election, votes for that party in respect of that district will not be counted in respect of that district.

On an election petition on this ground, the candidates of the party so elected will be able to sit in Parliament pending a determination of that election petition. Election petitions should be determined within two months of filing.

2) The present provisions regarding making available TV time and

broadcasting time as between political parties which is mandatory to be determined by administrative means after consultation with the Opposition.

3) Provision to be made for Members of Parliament of all Parties to participate in the formation of a Government for the purpose of assuring a stable Government.

4) The present restriction on the President in dissolving Parliament in the first year would be removed. Provision to be made for the President to dissolve Parliament in the first year on not more than two occasions.

5) Under the Proportional Representation system, the ballot paper will only contain the names of the Parties and their symbols. Each Party will have the right to choose their Members of Parliament from the list made public before the election. Each Party will submit its list of candidates according to its own rules. In the list submitted to the Commissioner of Elections, there will be no reserve candidates.

CSO: 4220/241

OPPOSITION CONDEMNS CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

Colombo THE ISLAND in English 9 Jul 82 p 1

[Text]

Opposition parties have vehemently opposed the proposed amendments to the Constitution announced on Wednesday by the Cabinet.

While the SLFP(S) leaders with Mrs. Sirima Bandaranaike were consulting legal advisers, the LSSP and the SLFP(M) came out very strongly against these amendments.

The LSSP's constitutional authority and architect of the 1972 Constitution, Dr. Colvin R. de Silva issued a statement calling for a four-party Conference consisting of the SLFP(S), SLFP(M), TULF and the CP(Moscow Wing) on 'the abolition of the Executive Powers of the President and restoration of the Supremacy of Parliament'.

The LSSP is seeking similar discussions with other parties, too, on the same Party-to-Party basis, Dr. de Silva's letter said.

In another statement issued by Dr. de Silva, the proposed amendments to the Constitution were described as a 'crime against Parliamentary Democracy'.

Dr. de Silva's statement says that the proposed changes embody the legislative part of the UNP government's last-minute effort to stave off defeat to which they now stand doomed at both the Parliamentary general election and the Presidential election.

On the provisions regarding those who have any dealings with those who have lost their civic rights under the Special Presidential Commissions's decision, he observes that the manifest aim is to make Mrs. Bandaranaike an electoral leper.

The means adopted is to monkey with the processes of the law to the point of holding the Courts up to ridicule. To traffic with her during elections is considered a corrupt practice and on an injunction being applied in this regard during the course of an election, votes for that party will not be counted in respect of that district, he says. This, Dr. de Silva says is on mere application and not on determination of the truth or otherwise of the allegation in the application.

An election which, under another provision, can be as short as only two weeks, no doubt precludes the possibility of bringing such an application to determination before the conclusion of the election. In other words, any lying application will do to cut a party out of the count, that is to say the election. The proposal is monstrous he states.

CSO: 4220/241

SRI LANKA

CHANGES IN ELECTION LAWS OPPOSED

BK090953 Hong Kong AFP in English 0806 GMT 9 Jul 82

[Text] Colombo, 9 Jul (AFP)--Opposition political parties in Sri Lanka have condemned as a "crime against parliamentary democracy" proposed amendments to the constitution and election law announced Wednesday [7 July] by the cabinet.

They said that the amendments were little more than a desperate bid by the ruling United National Party to stay in power.

The intended changes would permit a presidential election to be held before a general election and also allow the president to dissolve parliament at least twice in the first year after a legislative poll.

Another major change is that the time lag between the announcement of an election and nomination day would be 1 week and between nomination day and the election 2 to 4 weeks.

Moreover, any politician receiving campaign help from a person deprived of civic rights by a special presidential commission will not only put himself in jeopardy but also his party in that particular district. Former Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike has already been disenfranchised.

The pro-Trotskyist Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) issued a statement describing the amendments as a "crime against parliamentary democracy."

LSSP leader Colvin de Silva said that the proposed changes were part of the ruling United National Party government's last-minute efforts to stave off defeat in both the parliamentary and presidential elections.

The pro-Moscow Communist Party said that the intended amendments showed that President Junius Jayewardene and his government were far from confident of their stability.

The amendments are "yet another attempt by this government to abuse the processes of democracy, rig the elections in their favor and deny the people a real free choice about who should govern them," the communist party said.

Meanwhile, former Prime Minister Bandaranaike challenged the government yesterday to hold elections without further amendments to the constitution.

Mrs Bandaranaike was disenfranchised for 7 years over 20 months ago, losing her civic rights, including the right to participate in an election during this period.

Cabinet minister Gamini Dissanayake yesterday dismissed opposition charges that the proposed amendments were an attempt to save the government from inevitable defeat.

"If the opposition parties think that they can defeat us, let them try, because we shall not deny their right to do so," Mr Dissanayake was quoted as saying by the island newspaper.

Political observers said that the government was trying to exploit major differences in the opposition and disarray in Mrs Bandaranaike's Freedom Party, the chief contender for power.

Meanwhile, the SUN newspaper, quoting well-informed political sources, said that the country's first presidential poll is likely to be held in December. Under existing law the presidential election is due at the beginning of 1984 and the general election sometime before that.

CSO: 4220/250

EDITORIAL EXAMINES CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

Colombo THE ISLAND in English 9 Jul 82 p 6

[Editorial]

[Text]

Political developments have begun moving with a swiftness which can leave the uninitiated baffled and even a bit breathless. Yesterday all the newspapers reported the proposed revision of the Constitution announced by the Cabinet on Wednesday and as our lead story noted yesterday the most significant of these changes will be the one that will empower the President to call a Presidential election even immediately. The signs are pretty clear. There will be a Presidential Election before the Parliamentary election.

Observers will also note the swiftness with which the Government has taken note of an anomaly pointed out by the "Far Eastern Economic Review" in its recent cover story on Sri Lanka, which was reprinted in "The Island" on June 22. The Review said that according to the Constitution as it stood now the President could not go in for a fresh Presidential election before his term of office was over. Now the Government has decided to make it possible for the President to seek re-election any time after the end of the second year.

What is significant about this change is that it removes the uncertainty which existed in the public mind about the stability of the political system under the new Executive Presidency promulgated by the present Constitution. As the Constitution stands now the Presidential election will have to follow the Parliamentary election.

What happens then if a UNP President is faced with a hostile Parliament? This question had been troubling the political commentator and even the intelligent layman. Would the President be in a position to control Parliament or would conditions of near anarchy be the result? This new situation however will put the public mind at rest since the changes make it possible for the Presidential election to precede the Parliamentary election.

From the point of view of the Government's interests too the changes come at an opportune time. If the President is re-elected at the polls it will equip him with the necessary confidence to cleanse his party before he leads it to face the

Parliamentary election. No longer will the President be dependent on the Government MPs to campaign on his behalf thus making him reluctant to take strict action against the corrupt and the wayward in his ranks. It will make it possible for him to crack the whip over the heads of those who have gone astray and to infuse new blood into the party.

The proposed changes relating to the system of Proportional Representation however appear partial and incomplete, particularly in the light of the much trumpeted move by the Government to give PR a human face. It appears as if the Government has left it to each party to make its own arrangements in this connection.

The Cabinet press release announcing the changes merely says "Each party will have the right to choose their members of Parliament from the list made public before the election. Each party will submit its list of candidates according to its own rules."

It is not immediately clear how this will make it possible for votes to be cast for the candidate as well as the party as the Government was planning to do. It would have been better if the procedure had been incorporated into the law rather than left to each party to formulate.

Observers of the politically piquant will also note the change in the wording of the provision preventing those who had forfeited their civic rights from campaigning at the elections. The prohibition this time applies to "persons" making use of them while earlier it said "parties".

This too shows that the Government has been quick to note the possibility also spotlighted by the Far Eastern Economic Review of Mrs. Sirima Bandaranaike campaigning for the UNP! All these show even in a negative sense that the Government is alert to developments in the country.

Anyway the fact that the Government has decided to drop the further restrictions on persons without civic rights campaigning at elections which they had earlier envisaged is to be welcomed.

MEASURES TAKEN TO PREVENT CLASHES IN JAFFNA

Colombo THE ISLAND in English 8 Jul 82 p 2

[Article by D.B.S. Jeyarai]

[Text]

Special care is being taken to prevent Police and Armed Services personnel from getting involved in incidents of friction with the general public in the North.

Senior Officers stationed in the North have been advised to take extra precautions and maintain vigilance so as to curb the rank and file from harassing the public in view of the tense situation prevailing in Jaffna following Friday's shooting at Nelliaddy, where four Policemen were killed.

These instructions come in the wake of a reported skirmish between Police Personnel and the Public last Sunday in Nelliaddy at the very junction where Friday's shooting took place. The incident had occurred when a police jeep had stalled at the Nelliaddy junction. Policemen had asked members of the public to push the Jeep and they had done so. However, a few policemen are alleged to have assaulted some people and smashed the showcases of two shops after the jeep started. This had caused panic in Nelliaddy for some time.

An Intelligence sleuth told 'The Island' that they had been getting unexpected public co-operation while investigating Friday's shooting. Information was readily forthcoming and a genuine feeling of horror and indignation over Friday's killings were perceptible. We are keen that this atmosphere should continue to prevail as it is very necessary for fruitful investigations, he said.

Another top Police officer was of the view that Friday's shooting had been intended to provoke Police and Service Personnel on venting their fury over the killings on the Public.. 'This had

been a normal terrorist tactic and had succeeded in the past', he said.

'But this time, we are taking care that the men do not get out of hand', he said.

Police sources also said that during the last few months, a climate of goodwill and cordiality between Police and Public was slowly building up in Jaffna. Friday's killing was intended to put a stop to this situation, these sources said.

A Government spokesman also viewed Friday's killing as an incident calculated to disrupt the climate created by the high-level Committee and the TULF. The spokesman saw a parallel between the Nachimar Kovilady shooting which took place a year ago and the Nelliaddy shooting. 'After the Nachimar Koviladdy shooting, some policemen went on the rampage in Jaffna', the Government spokesman said.

'As a result', he said all the good work done by the Government for building up better relations with the Tamils was undone in a day'.

'In the present situation, too, the Government has once again steadily built up better relations with the North, and the Nelliaddy shooting was intended to put the clock back once again, he said.

Intelligence sources also said that the terrorist elements were intent on evoking another clash soon. The bombs-by-mail campaign and the Nelliaddy shooting were inter-related they said.

GOVERNMENT RECOMMENDS EXEMPTION FOR FOREIGN EARNINGS OF COMPANIES

Colombo THE ISLAND in English 7 Jul 82 p 3

[Article by Richard de Silva and Ravindran Casinader]

[Text]

FOREIGN currency earnings of professional companies and firms would be exempted from income tax, if such earnings are brought back to Sri Lanka.

This was said by the Acting Minister of Finance and Planning, Mr. M. H. M. Naina Marikar explaining the legal effect of the Inland Revenue (Amendment) Bill, in Parliament yesterday.

He said that the amendments were related to some of the tax proposals mentioned by the Finance Minister in his budget speech of 1981.

Explaining various other measures taken by the government to revamp the economy, the acting Minister said the interest accruing to any person from moneys deposited in a foreign currency account, for the period such person was non-resident and three years after he became a resident would be exempted from income tax.

He also read out various provisions of the Bill which would give legal effect to certain budget proposals of 1981.

The TULF MP for Mannar, P. S. Soosaithasan while welcoming the tax proposals observed that administrative concessions or discretions were not given adequate publicity and as a result the public were not aware of some of the concessions.

The concessions should be embodied in the law "and should not be left to the whims and fancies of officials", the Member said.

Where the Bill did not take effect on the date of the Speaker's assent

the date when the law would take effect should be mentioned in the Bill, Mr. Soosaithasan added.

The TULF Member also asked the Deputy Minister to consider extending concessions now given to Sri Lankans earning foreign exchange abroad to those working for foreign organisations here and are receiving payment in foreign exchange.

The Bill was passed with some amendments.

CSO: 4220/241

POLICE EFFECT MAJOR CHANGE IN NORTH

Colombo SUN in English 9 Jul 82 p 1

[Article by Ranil Weerasinghe]

[Text] Policemen in the Jaffna peninsula will be required in future to serve only a one-year term, it was decided yesterday.

This means that it will become mandatory for personnel in all ranks of the Police service to serve for a period in the north.

The decision was taken at a conference held yesterday morning at the Defense Ministry, presided over by the Deputy Defence Minister T. B. Werapitiya.

It comes in the wake of last week's ambush of a Police party, resulting in the deaths of four policemen.

Defence Ministry sources told 'SUN' the new scheme would help overcome the present problem in appointing officers and men to the north, which is now considered a 'danger station'. It was also pointed out that officers could give of their best while serving there, secure in the knowledge that they would be entitled to a transfer before they became targets.

With this move, the Ministry decided to effect a series of transfers of personnel, Deputy Inspector-General (Northern Range) A. Navaratnam is to return and he will be replaced by DIG W. Rajagune, while Superintendent A. A. Anandarahajah takes over as SP, Jaffna from SP Richard Wijesekera.

The following appointments were also made: D. Mahendran (DIG, Batticaloa), Ernest Perera (Personnel, Training and Traffic), L.M. P. De Silva (DIG, Greater Colombo), A. Ariyasinghe (DIG, North-Central Range).

Meanwhile the Police have rushed squads of their para-military units, the task force and the special combat unit to the north. They are to seek Army assistance to train several more squads to take up posts in areas in the north and provide back-up cover for the regular officers.

CSO: 4220/240

BRIEFS

HOLD FREE, FAIR ELECTIONS--Mrs. Sirima Bandaranaike has challenged the UNP to face an election without further amending the Constitution. At a joint rally of the SLFP(S), the MEP and the Democratic National Front held at Hyde Park yesterday, she said that today there is fear in many quarters that an election will be held. She said that every election held since 1947 had been peaceful and no one had ever said that elections were not fair. There have been some incidents at elections which were caused by thugs but the Election Commissioner had never been accused of being unfair. But the incidents in Jaffna during the DDC elections when some ballot boxes disappeared has caused much concern about future elections. Messrs T.B. Illangaratne, Dinesh Gunewardene, Anil Moonesinghe, Kulasiri Kumarage, G.I.D. Dharmasekera were among those who spoke. [Norman Palihawadana] [Text] [Colombo THE ISLAND in English 9 Jul 82 p 2]

JOBS ON ETHNIC BASIS--Admissions to universities as well as employment in the state sector are to be restricted by a quota system that is to be worked out on an ethnic basis. Cabinet yesterday approved the establishment of a committee to work out this new quota system. Cabinet spokesman Anandatissa de Alwis said that under this system the majority community will have the assurance that opportunities in these fields to members of other communities are subject to a ceiling so that there will be no undue erosion of their legitimate share. At the same time, he said, the minority community will have a sense of relief that they are guaranteed their quota in these fields. This, he said would go a long way towards the creation of an atmosphere of confidence and harmony among the members of all communities. The committee appointed to work out this system includes the Secretaries of the Ministries of Public Administration, Higher Education, Trade and Shipping, Local Government, Housing and Construction, Additional Secretary to the President and an officer nominated by Minister S. Thondaman. [Text] [Colombo SUN in English 8 Jul 82 p 1]

ARMY, POLICE PATROLS JAFFNA--Combined patrolling by the Police and the Army has been resumed in the Jaffna district following last Friday's shooting at Nelliaddy in which four policemen died. Earlier, they were engaged in joint patrolling after the attack on Anaicottai police station last year. Combined patrolling however, was suspended some time ago. The investigation into the Nelliaddy shooting has now been taken over by a special team of CID operatives. An intensive search is being conducted in the peninsula for the weapons used by the killers. The inquest into the Nelliaddy deaths will be held by the acting Magistrate of Jaffna, Mr V. P. Sundaralingam, following the death of the Point Pedro Magistrate Mr K. S. Mahesan. [Text] [Colombo THE ISLAND in English 9 Jul 82 p 2]

TULF OPPOSES CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE--TULF Vice-President V. N. Navaratnam, who is acting for his party leaders Mr Appapillai Amirthalingham and Mr M. Sivasithamparam who have not yet returned from New York, referring to the proposed amendments said yesterday that his party "was opposed to any changes being made in the Constitution to serve ad hoc purposes". Mr Navaratnam said: "We are certainly opposed to MPs being given the right to change their party affiliations after they enter Parliament, particularly when elections are to be in future held under the proportional representation system which places emphasis on the party". The TULF Vice-President also said that it would be a restriction on the franchise if the voter is expected to vote only for the party and not for the individual candidate of his choice. [Text] [Colombo THE ISLAND in English 2 Jul 82 p 2]

BANDARANAIKE SEES VICTORY--"Now we are deprived of our party headquarters as the government wants to give it to Mr Maithripala Senanayaka, who did not even assist us in building it. Furthermore we may not even get the hand symbol for the coming elections. However, the S.L.F.P. depends only on the principles of its late founder, and it doesn't need a headquarters or the hand symbol to win a election. If Mrs Indira Gandhi could win under a new symbol in a country where the rate of illiteracy is as high as 60%, the loss of the hand symbol would not be a problem in our country which has a high literacy rate" said Mrs Sirima Bandaranaike, leader of the S.L.F.P. (S). speaking at a public rally held in Devinuwara on July 3. Mr Mahinda Wijesekara, Chief Organizer of the S.L.F.P. (S) for Devinuwara, presided at the meeting. Mrs Bandaranaike said that a lot of money was wanted on the "Udagama" project. Four houses could easily be built with the money that is spent to build one house under the Udagama programme. [Text] [Colombo THE ISLAND in English 9 Jul 82 p 2]

CSO: 4220/241

SURAT THANI REPORT OF CPT OPERATIONS CHALLENGES RTG CLAIMS OF SUCCESS

Bangkok SIAM MAI in Thai 19 Jun 82 pp 19-21

[Article: "Chaiburi Subdistrict, the Effects of the 'Tai Rom Yen' Policy"]

[Text] This report, entitled "Chaiburi Subdistrict, the Effects of the 'Tai Rom Yen' policy," was written by a student who lives in Surat Thani. He sent it to SIAM MAI by mail. It details the case of communist terrorists attacking the Chaiburi Subdistrict administrative office and the events that took place following this attack. We feel that it is an interesting report and so we are presenting it for consideration by readers.

The government has announced that the CPT has been defeated and that the four military services have foiled [the CPT's] plans. Prem has spread this news throughout the world and MATUPHUM headlined this news in its Friday, 14 May 1982, edition. But at 0020 hours that same day, at least 100 Thai People's Liberation Armed Forces, Surat Thani Zone, came from the Khao Na Daeng Camp near Ban Khuan Ngai in Song Phraek Commune, Chaiburi Subdistrict, and from nearby zones and surrounded and seized the Chaiburi Subdistrict [administrative office]. They "withdrew at daybreak" said a villager there.

Chaiburi Subdistrict was recently spearated from Phra Saeng District. Some people in Surat Thani are still confused. They wonder how long this subdistrict has been in existence and they do not know where they are living. This area has become well-known throughout the world because of the actions of the TPLAF. Chaiburi Subdistrict is located away from Muang District, Surat Thani Province. You travel 96 kilometers along the Surat Thani-Krabi highway (past Ban Na San, Ban Song and Phra Saeng districts; the bus fare is 25 baht); you then turn left onto a road that is presently under construction and go another 7 kilometers (there are motorcycles that charge 15 baht for the ride). This subdistrict is located next to Plai Phra Ya District in Krabi Province. Mr Wisut Tansutthiwanit is the head of the subdistrict. The subdistrict is still mostly rural in nature. There is not even a public health clinic here. There is electricity, however.

Approximately 1 month before this took place, the 403rd Company of Thahan Phran Irregulars, most of whom are local people who are experts in the terrain and who are good fighters, that was stationed there withdrew and set up its operations base at Chong Chang in Ban Na San District. While the 403rd Company of irregulars was stationed here, the TPLAF attacked their camp many times but they never destroyed it. Once before this, the TPLAF attacked and overran a police station. They burned down the Chaiburi Commune police station and only the cement pillars remain now. The station has not been rebuilt. As for the police barracks, the TPLAF did not burn it that time nor did they do so this time. A villager there said that the "communists were afraid that this would catch the houses of the villagers [on fire]."

With a southern accent, a villager there said that government officials said that they had destroyed the communist camp at Khao Na Daeng. At that time, Mr Thanwa shot and killed Mr Mana and Mr Prasoet (TPLAF leaders). Mr Thanwa left the camp and became a Than Phran Irregular. Later on, he took a force of irregulars from Camp 403 to attack the communist camp at Khao Na Daeng and destroyed it. But when the irregulars left, the communists returned. At present, Mr Thanwa is still working as a Thahan Phran Irregular.

It is well known in that area that Chaiburi Subdistrict was formed because the monk Suwannaophat at Wat Samai Suwan sent a letter asking that Chaiburi Subdistrict be established. This subdistrict was established and the road that comes here was built because of this monk. It is for this reason that the TPLAF do not like this monk.

"The TPLAF have come." Concerning the events that day, the villagers said that the "communists called out as they came. There were a lot of them. Look, there were so many that they surrounded the subdistrict administrative office, Wat Samai Suwan and the police barracks and others, we don't know how many, hid in ambush along the road that officials would use to send in reinforcements."

Concerning what happened that day, the TPLAF surrounded the area and fired on two places, the police barracks and Wat Samai Suwan. Suwannaophat said that they did this because he had allowed the monks' dining hall to be used as the subdistrict administrative office. Weapons and various items were stored in his quarters and so the wat was fired on. As for why the TPLAF wanted to shoot him, he said that the communists felt that he was conspiring with the enemy. Suwannaophat told them that they "should not blame anyone. Even a dog should be given a place to sleep." When the communists came to his quarters, Suwannaophat told them to go ahead and take his belongings. He told the communists not to come around his quarters with guns since there were no police there. But the TPLAF fired anyway. There are bullet holes the size of pens there and one hole where a grenade was exploded.

During that night when the TPLAF attacked Chaiburi Subdistrict, the name of Mr Samat was called out very often. Was this because the commander of the TPLAF was Mr Samat? We asked a news source to take us to meet the TPLAF in order to get information since the TPLAF camp is only about 6 kilometers from there, that is, it is in the green hills ahead. This news source told us in a

fatherly way that we shouldn't go. He said that it was dangerous and that we should wait for the next chance. He also said that it was impossible to see the faces of the communists that night because the communists used their flashlights from waist level. Thus, it was impossible to see them clearly. But they were in full uniform.

The news source stated that the commander [of the Thai force] is not a good person. He demands protection money and does not carry out his duties. He shows up for work infrequently. But his subordinates do not dare say anything.

The villagers said that when the communists siezed government property at the police barracks, they took the policemen's trousers too. One police official said that he had 100 baht in his pants pocket. "I didn't have any money." The communists took the money from his pants pocket and sent it back to him. "The communists spoke nicely" to the villagers, but the villagers like the Thahan Phran Irregulars from Camp 403. They have appealed for the return of this group and its leader, Mr Yothin. The reason for this is that these irregulars are all people from that village.

The communists seized weapons, ammunition, police clothing (especially uniforms), typewriters, medicines from the health center and other items. Two policemen were wounded. The wife of one policeman was killed; she was shot while sleeping. The villagers say that one H.K. rifle was saved because one policeman escaped in time and he took the rifle with him. And it is this rifle that has given rise to a question about what happened after these events.

The next evening after this occurred, four policemen there were sitting around drinking in the evening as they usually did. But that day, they were probably very angry. At any rate, "around 2200 hours these four men went out and started shooting in the village. That night, no one in the two or three villages here got any sleep. They also entered the wat and shot almost 100 rounds there." "What do you think such action means?" "But the previous night, none of them dared do anything; none of them fought for even 1 minute. But when the communists left, they started threatening the villagers."

On the morning of the 16th, a higher unit ordered a special force composed of Regional Security Volunteers, Mobile Development Unit forces and border patrol police to go join together at Thahan Phran Irregular Camp 403, which had been deserted but which is now in use again (this camp is next to the subdistrict administrative office and Wat Samai Suwan). The commander of the company is Police Sub-Lieutenant Chingchai Amornrat.

The two policemen who were wounded are recuperating at the Surat Thani Hospital. Thus, we can ask directly about the villagers statement that the "police did not fight the communists at all." These policemen said weakly that "some policemen did not have weapons. The villagers talk like this becасue they do not support us." (Oh! That is what they think.) They also said that "we had received the radio only 2-3 days before. A Thahan Phran Irregular added that "that night, my unit moved quickly (using 20 motorcycles). Our Thahan Phran Irregulars were armed with heavy weapons such as RPGs. We were stationed in Khlong Prap

Commune, Ban Na San District. We quickly hurried to provide help but when we reached Khlong Ta Bi, we lost contact with the subdistrict radio. My group then retreated because we were afraid that we would clash with our own side.

The war is thus full of blood and tears. At present in Surat Thani (a place with good people whose name was given by the king), there is war every day and the war smolders constantly everywhere -- in Chong Chang, Kanchanadit, Wiang Sara, Khia Na Sa and Phra Saeng in Chaiburi Subdistirct. Yes, those who are dying are soldiers who were born in the villages here. The "jungle" soldiers were not born in the jungle; they are from the villages. Thus, at the bus stop to go to Ban Na San, I could not refrain from saying: "Don't make me say it. The state recruits soldiers from the villages. The soldiers are the defenders of the country. But why are they fighting at Chong Chang for Mr Phe? The dead are the sons of everyone." But regardless, it is the mothers in the countryside who will suffer.

The people's war in Surat Thani, a place of good people, continues.

11943

CSO: 6133/0021

EDITORIAL DISCUSSES CPT ELECTORAL CONTINGENCY

Bangkok PATINYA in Thai 14 Jun 82 pp 1, 2

[Editorial: "The CPT, Into Parliament"]

[Text] The most recent policy on fighting the communists includes Order No 66/1981, which was promulgated on 23 April 1981. The essence of this order is that politics must lead the military. That is, political fighting is considered to be most important followed by military fighting. But in actual practice, in some areas, large forces may have to be used to destroy the CPT's important bases first. And once the CPT has lost influence in these areas, this can be followed by continuous development. The effect of this order has been to generate large-scale operations in all the regions. For example, there has been the "Wannarat" operation to eradicate the enemy, the "Tai Rom Yen" plan, the "Suriyaphong" plan, the "Nan Krieng Krai" plan and the "Pha Muong Phadetsuk" plan. The government has succeeded in destroying several of the CPT's bases. And in an announcement on 26 October 1981 concerning an evaluation of the results of implementing the policy according to Order No 66, it was stated that the "CPT has been eradicated." The CPT responded to this statement militarily by mobilizing forces and attacking government officials in some places and bombing several government buildings. At the same time, the CPT has avoided being wiped out by dispersing its forces and dividing them into small units, which fight using guerrilla tactics. Also, they have infiltrated the villages and cities in accord with the "3 zones, 2 battlefields" policy. Even the government has admitted that there are armed units in the cities.

Because the CPT is using such tactics, the government feels that the CPT has been defeated by force on the military front. The government now wants to concentrate on fighting in the cities during the next 6 months, as was announced by military officials on 12 May 1982. At the same time, a government official said that allowing the CPT to play politics legally in a parliamentary way is being considered. This was criticized by many people, who asked how great an effect this would have in practice and how much this would affect national security.

This idea of allowing the CPT to become a legal political party has been put forward several times before. But it has never been put into practice because of the lack of response by both the government and the CPT. This has never been done even though allowing the CPT to fight using political methods is

something that the Thai people in general want since this would put an end to the killing of each other. And this would allow the government to launch a real political offensive at the strategic level using democracy as the tool. This would enable the government, which is democratic, to defeat the communists in the end. But the CPT well knows that if the government really allows it to come fight in parliament, the CPT will lose the conditions that enable it to fight militarily and it will probably not have a chance to win in a parliamentary system. This can be seen from the fact that the CPT has never made appeals to be allowed to fight in parliament. It has only asked for the repeal of the Communist [Suppression] Act so that its activities are not interfered with. And it has acted like a good "relative" of the government and Thai army in order to have the government take part in fighting a war against the Vietnamese, who are just communists of another camp. Furthermore, the CPT has attacked the idea of having the CPT fight in a parliamentary way as being a revisionist idea.

Thus, if the CPT is given an opportunity to operate as a legal party, the real CPT would not come out to fight [in parliament]. Instead, some other party that is part of the CPT's united front would enter parliament and serve as a tool to learn the government's secrets or to prevent the government from carrying out various operations. This would be done to benefit the CPT rather than to help build democracy or to build real security for the country. In the government's present situation in which there are conflicts and democracy is fragile allowing the CPT or the united front of the CPT to play a political role legally would create a weak spot for the government and the communists could use this democracy to destroy the government.

It is a general principle that, before implementing a strategy in such a way, plans must be made first concerning all aspects. This will enable the strategy to achieve results in accord with the targets. Thus, the government must make preparations for this strategy's offensive. The government must eliminate its own weaknesses by building a complete democracy. At the same time, this will build up the government's security by separating legislative and executive power. Once we have a secure democracy, we will be able to develop the economy and society so that they become stronger. Then, when the CPT is given a chance to fight in accord with the ways of a real democracy, the CPT will not be able to fool the people into thinking that its thinking is more democratic than that of the government. Even if it uses the words "The New Democracy" or "The People's Democracy," it will not be able to fool the people since the government will have already instituted the type of democracy desired by the people.

Concerning opening the door to allow the CPT to use parliament, some people may become alarmed that the CPT will take this opportunity to form a government and then take away democracy from the people. PATINYA does not feel that this is any cause for concern. Various studies and indications by various groups of people show that the Thai people do not like communism. A political example of this dislike for communism is that, in several past election, the political parties that were said to have received support from the communists failed to win the votes of the people and these parties have grown smaller and smaller.

PATINYA supports the idea of allowing the CPT to come compete in a parliamentary way, which is a peaceful way. But before allowing this, the government must first establish a secure democratic system of government. It can then step into the fighting arena.

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CSO: 6133/0021

CPT SPLIT NOTED IN CAPTURED DOCUMENTS

Bangkok THE NATION REVIEW in English 29 May 82 p 14

[Text]

THE PRO-PEKING leadership of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) is believed to have proposed a compromise line of thinking in the wake of escalating ideological wrangle seriously hurting the outlawed party.

An informed source monitoring the CPT said recently that a "significant" document seized from Camp 508 early this year indicated that the CPT leadership might have been trying to patch up the ideological differences between the pro-Chinese elements and the more independent factions in the party.

The paper which was seized during the large-scale military offensive against the strongest communist stronghold in the South in May was believed to have been the first clear-cut directive from the leadership to its operatives over the ideological disputes, according to analysts.

"We believe that the directive, fully packed with statistics, was an attempt of the leadership core to drum up support from its rank and file for a new neutral line of thinking," the source said.

The directive was released after the communist cadres in at least two of the four regional operational zones of CPT had proposed a new line of thinking which centres on the analysis of the stage of the evolution of the Thai society and a shift in the CPT strategy from the Maoist line.

An informed analyst quoted intelligence reports as confirming that communist operatives in the southern part of the Northeastern Operational Zone had submitted their views on these questions to the leadership early this year.

The CPT ranks in another operational zone covering the northern

part of the Northeast have also reportedly aired their new line of thinking to the party central committee, according to the analyst.

He added that communist operatives in the South are also divided over the issue which communists hold the vital key to the success of their revolution.

The directive which would have predictably touched off another round of serious ideological debates within the trouble-plagued outlawed party has apparently recognized, to a certain degree, the divergent lines of thinking, particularly on the question of the importance the party should attach to its urban operations.

For the first time ever, the leadership admitted in the captured document the "strategic importance" of its urban front and the previous failure to concentrate almost all its efforts in the creation of "liberated areas" in the rural areas.

"Judging from the lessons drawn by the revolutionary forces within and without the country, the importance of the urban operations should not be restricted to coordinating with and supporting the armed struggle in the rural areas only, but should also cover another strategic front..." the document said.

The paper also said that the controversial CPT directive of "Emphasizing the work to expand rural strongholds" might require a new definition which is in line with the reality of the country.

CPT obviously welcomed left-wing student and labour activists from the urban areas to the jungle with little limitations and screening in the wake of the October 6, 1976

incident.

The policy later proved to be a serious miscalculation when most of the activists defected from the outlawed party being disillusioned with, among other things, the misuse of their competence and the hardships in the jungle.

According to the document, the strengthening of the so-called "liberated zones" in such a small country with sound infrastructure as Thailand would be possible only if and when the outlawed party has built up a strong army.

"The possible format in the present situation is for us to set up military bastions in the jungle and rugged areas and at the same time to expand zones for guerrilla warfare propped up by underground authorities," the document said.

The paper also called for more efforts to set up small guerrilla and military units to pave way for the building of a large-scale army in the future.

In another apparent concession to the CPT low-level operatives, the document recognized the increasing importance of the working class to its cause.

"The party has to pay special attention to the working class which will serve as a solid bastion for its urban operations, once it is organized under the leadership of the party," the document said.

It added that most of the workers were still lacking in "political consciousness" and had yet to be organized.

However, the document made reservations over the proposals from its rank and file in the Northeast to take "military measures" in the urban areas to rock the government.

OPERATIVES

According to another document submitted by operatives in the southern part of the Northeast Operational Zone to the leadership, the cadres had proposed that armed struggle in the urban areas should not be denied, although the political campaigns would still take precedence.

"Preparations should be made for the armed struggle, but political repercussions must be taken into account before a military action will be mounted in the urban areas," the report said.

Touching on its much-criticized relations with Peking, the leadership said in the four-page paper that the party had to be mainly self-reliant following the drastic cut-back in aid from China.

"But we will have to seriously review our external and internal policies to drum up as much as international support for our revolution as possible, lest the party would not be isolated," the paper said.

The statement obviously admitted that the party had been severely criticized for "our following closely behind others."

Despite concessions, the document obviously avoided from being specific whether its proposed strategy is still within the Maoist strategy of using the rural areas to strangle the urban areas of a new strategy proposed by the more nationalist factions.

Nonetheless, its purpose to build up a strong army based in the rural areas implies that the pro-Peking leadership core still adheres to the Maoist line of overthrowing the government from its jungle bastions in the final stage of the armed showdown as anticipated by the communist party.

"For the CPT leadership, the strategic shifts proposed by the more nationalists is only a tactical adjustment," the source said.

He added that the leadership had earlier told certain operational zones that it would not mind if they would resort to the proposed strategic changes.

The document also discussed on the nature of the Thai society which is the other major area of difference.

The leadership has ostensibly softened its position over the issue, but it still concluded in the paper that the Thai society is still what Maoists call "Semi-colonial, Semi-feudal."

According to the document, the leadership still holds the "US and Japanese imperialists" as the party's No. One enemies. The northern part of the Northeastern Operational Zone had earlier proposed a new theory which played down the "imperialist influence" to the extent that the country is only "dependent" on the imperialists in economic terms.

"The regional operational zone has set forth the most radical change in the analysis of the society."

For operatives in the zone, the Thai society is not a semi-colonial

one, but a capitalist country which remains dependent on imperialists in terms of its exports," the source said.

The analysis on the No. One enemy in the paper, however, is fundamentally in line with that proposed by the communist cadres in the southern part of the Northeastern Operational Zone which has admitted the same "most formidable enemy."

Nevertheless, the document debated against the theory proposed by the operational zone which has proposed that the No. 2 enemy of the country was the so-called "big capitalist class," and not the so-called "feudal class" as was formerly believed.

Interestingly enough, the party's leadership admitted for the first time in the document that the influence of the "big capitalists" has now been on the same par with that of feudalists.

"In the past 20 years, the imperialists have encouraged the ruling class to promote investment in the country, prompting a steep increase in the influence of the capitalists in the economic structure. But this is still short of a fundamental change in the nature of the Thai society," the paper said.

It also said the feudal "form of exploitation" is still prevalent in the rural areas which remain the base of the Thai economy.

The paper also said that the party must attach priority to its campaigns against the internal enemies rather than the external enemy, namely the United States.

"Because the conflicts between the people and the ruling class are more bitter, more obvious, then we must focus our attacks against the revolutionary government," the captured document said.

Referring to the United States, the paper said that although the country's influence over Thailand has substantially diminished following the withdrawal of its forces from Thailand, no other imperialists have so far replaced its dominance here.

However, the paper said that the party must at the same time brace itself for an aggression of the Soviet Union against the country.

The document, whether it was issued from the leadership core or not, clearly represents the views of the pro-Chinese faction in the party and would have predictably cause a certain degree of repercussions.

Cynics in the rank and file of the CPT might have described the proposal as only "a cosmetic change" while the more loyal followers could welcome it.

Touching on the impact, officials believed that the ongoing ideological debate would not be over too soon and the CPT would still be in disarray until the differences are patched up.

The results of the continuing debate would also decide as to whether the CPT leadership would be able to hold the long-awaited fourth party congress.

"If not, the party could be even more seriously split," an official said.

RTG ANTI-CPT OFFENSIVE STALLS

Bangkok THE NATION REVIEW in English 22 Jun 82 p 6

[Text]

THE Second Army Region is still unable to wipe out about 1,400 armed communist insurgents in the jungles of the Northeast because of certain weaknesses of government officials, a military officer said over the weekend.

Information officer of the Second Army Region Col Sa-ngiam Ratanasimakorn told *The Nation* that communist insurgents are still viable because they have made use of "loopholes" on the government's side to gain political ground.

However, he said communist insurgents in Isarn are now in disarray following government offensives against them, judging from a document, entitled "Proposals on Military Adjustment" from Isarn communist insurgents to the leadership of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT).

He said the document seized in a communist-infested area between Sakon Nakhon and Kalasin last month was another attempt of communist insurgents to bring about ideological unity in the rank and file of CPT.

The Second Army Region places top priority to its "political offensive"

to win the support of the people from communist insurgents, said Col Sa-ngiam who added the Second Army Region recently distributed about 10,000 leaflets calling on communist sympathizers and insurgents to surrender to the government.

However, he admitted that some communist insurgents were instructed by their leaders to feign defectors to infiltrate in "the rear line" of the government.

"These people have been given financial support from their leaders. They won't desert the party, though they would suspend contacts with CPT temporarily," he said.

The seized document calls on the party leadership to "make use of every opportunity possible in extending their operational areas and even infiltrate into government organizations to create divisiveness in the government".

The information officer said communist insurgents in the Northeast tended to develop their guerrilla tactics and increase their efficiency in intelligence gathering for military purposes.

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END